HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR

D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1131 / 2002

Municipal Council Beawar

----Appellant

	Versus
M/S West Patent Press Company
		Respondent
	Connected With
	D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1130 / 2002
Municipal Council Beawar
		Appellant
	Versus
M/S West Patent Press Company
		Respondent
M C Beawar	D.B. Civil Contempt Petition No. 284 / 2005
		Petitioner
	Versus
Neelam Kumar Saxena
		Respondent
For Appellant(s)	: Mr. Parag Rastogi
For Respondent(s) : Mr. N.K. Maloo, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Sarthak	Rastogi

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S. JHAVERI

_____________________________________________________

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY KUMAR VYAS

Order

10/05/2017

1. All these appeals involve common questions of law and facts, hence they are decided by this common judgment.

2. The appellant by way of these appeals has challenged the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the petitions preferred by the petitioners-respondent herein.

2.1 The broad facts of the case are that as per an agreement (Annexure 2) which is photostat of true copy duly attested by Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Beawar, entered into between Captain Donald Robertson who was then President Municipal Committee Beawar alongwith two members, and Alfred Baker Esquire, duly qualified Agent of Mr. DK West (Agent in India of West's Patent Press Company Ltd.), a lease was executed on 17th April, 1880 for a plot of land adjoining in Chang Gate of Beawar admeasuring 3 acres for ten years from April, 1880, at annual rent of Rs.25/- per acre.

2.2 By second agreement, municipal land measuring 1 acre 2 rods 5 poles in Shahpura Mohalla Close to West Patent Press Company's factory was also taken on rent of Rs.75/- per annum for 10 years from July 1886.

2.3 By third agreement, municipal land measuring 2 acres adjoining Chang Gate of Beawar was also taken on lease at the annual rent of Rs.50/- per acre for 10 years from 26th April, 1890.

2.4 By lease agreement executed on 11th July 1896, municipal land in Shahpura Mohalla, Beawar measuring 1 acre 2 rods & 5 poles was put at enhanced annual rent of Rs.100/- per acre for ten years from July, 1896.

2.5 Then comes execution of an Indenture made on 30th June

1916 (Annexure 3 – photostat copy of true copy duly certified by Sub Registrar Beawar on 18/7/1996), whereby plot of land situated in Shahpura Mohalla near Chang Gate in the Municipality of Beawar measuring 4 acres 2 rods and 5 poles, was leased out by the Municipal Committee in favour of the lessee Company for 30 years from 26th April 1909 at a yearly rent of Rs.500/-.

2.6 This lease was renewed by an Indenture made on 1st April, 1941 (Annexure 4 xerox copy of true copy certified by Sub Registrar Beawar) whereby leased plot of land situated in Shahpura Mohalla in the Beawar town of Ajmer Marwar Block No.7 & Nazul List No.30, 31, measuring 4 acres 2 rods and 5 poles, was put on rent of Rs.750/- per annum for 30 years from 25th April, 1939.

2.7 Curiously enough, despite the fact that the lease term under agreement dt. 1.4.1941 (Ann 4) had expired on 25th April, 1969, and that the lessee Company continued in possession over the land in dispute even after 25.4.69, it was only on 18.6.75 when the State Government admittedly accorded sanction for lease of the land measuring 21,200 sq. yards (out of total leased land of 21931.22 sq. yards) and land measuring 731.22 sq. yards was not leased out on account of having been reserved for purposes of road construction by letter (Ann 5) for 30 years from 26th April, 1969 to 25th April, 1999 with the condition that annual lease rent was fixed at Rs.55,120/- and that no further renewal would be accorded after expiry of 30 years on 25th April, 1999 thereby the leased land would surrender back to Nagar Parishad, Beawar and

that agreement would be got executed and registered at the cost of the lessee.

2.8 Pursuant to the sanction of State Government (Ann 5) the Municipal Council, Beawar (respondent no. 2) sent a demand notice (Ann 6) on 11.7.75 asking the lessee Company to deposit to the tune of Rs.3,47,256/- outstanding from 26.4.69 to 25.4.75 with a specific stipulation to pay such outstanding lease rent and to further execute lease deed, failing which the land would be got vacated treating encroachment thereon.

2.9 It is the case of the petitioner Company that M/s West's Patent Co. Ltd. (Joint Stock Company having its HQ. Panipat Haryana) under sale deed dt. 1.1.72 (Ann1) sold the Cotton Ginning & Pressing Factory at Beawar commonly known as Factory of Wests' Patent Press Co. along with 13,336 sq yards of free hold open land and 21,931 sq yards perpetual lease hold land, besides superstructures for housing the godowns & residential quarters for the staff, built on lease hold land so also machinery fitted & lying therein, in favour of M/s West's Patent Press Company (P) Ltd. having its registered office at 32 Regal Building, Parliament Street, New Delhi for a consideration of Rs. Two lacs.

2.10 The Indenture (Ann13) has been produced to show that Mr. C.F. Letch, duly authorised and appointed Attorney of West Patent Press Co. Ltd (UK Company) has signed this indenture on 4th April, 1977 in furtherance to agreement dt.17.1.69, as modified by subsequent agreements dt. 5.10.1970, 29.4.1971, 1.1.72 & 23.3.77, in favour of West's Patent Press Co. (P) Ltd (Indian

Company) (petitioner herein), according to which the Indian Company had paid a sum of Rs.3,07,500/- to the UK Company as total consideration and thereby nothing remained to be paid as it was full & final settlement.

2.11 It is also the case of the Petitioner Company that a detailed representation (Ann7) was sent on 21.9.75 against letter No. 2618 dt. 28.7.75 demanding lease rent outstanding to the tune of Rs. 3,47,256/- in respect of renewal of the lease, inter-alia asserting that the land had already been demised in their favour in perpetuity as is evident from the indenture of lease deed dt. 1.4.1941; whereunder the Municipality had been given an option to revise the rent which in no case would exceed 33% of existing annual letting value of the site; therefore, method of capitalising the value of the land demised by valuing the land @ Rs.40/- per sq. yard and then finding the annual letting value thereof @ 6.5% is entirely without any jurisdiction.

2.12 Again surprisingly enough, indisputably, the petitioner Company obviously by virtue of its protest under representation dated 21.9.75 (Ann7), not only continued in possession over the land in dispute but also admittedly neither executed the lease deed nor paid lease rent determined pursuant to State government's sanction for renewal under letter dt. 18.6.75 (Ann5) and demanded by the respondent NO.2 vide letter dt. 11.7.75 (Ann6) even till further expiry of renewed term of lease of 30 years from 26.4.69 till 25.4.99 inasmuch as even earlier lease rent was @ Rs.750/- under agreement dt. 1.4.41 was not accepted by [SAW-1131/2002]

the respondent No.2.

2.13 Be that as it may, neither any decision was taken on the representation dt. 21.9.75 (Ann7) nor communicated it to the petitioner Company, nor the petitioner company could have been evicted from possession and thus admittedly, the possession over the land in dispute continued with the petitioner Company not only even after expiry of renewed term on 25.4.99 but also till date.

2.14 However, again on 7.1.99 three months – prior the expiry of renewed period of lease of 30 years on 25.4.99, the petitioner Company reiterating its case as to the lease being in perpetuity moved an application (Ann9) to the respondent No.2 seeking further renewal of the lease pursuant to earlier agreement of lease dated 1.4.1991 duly followed by reminder dt. 17.3.99. But no decision has been conveyed to the petitioner company. Hence this writ petition No. 2157/99.

3.1 In other appeal, by letter dt. 20.4.1972 (Ann1) of the West's patent Press Company (P) Ltd. Post Box No.28 GT Road Panipat addressed to the Chairman Municipal committee Beawar, the leassee Company agreed to surrender the land required by the respondent Municipality for providing road across to the godown sought to be opened from northern corner connecting the same to Nehru Nagar Colony without charging any compensation, and the lessee Company proposed to fix at Rs. 3,000/- per annum as lease rent and subject to this, they waived all their objections regarding enhancement of rent at old rates.

3.2 But despite the consent of surrender as to the land for road

construction having been given by letter dt. 20.4.72, it appears from letter dt.29.2.96 (Ann2) that such a land was not surrendered, therefore, the petitioner Company was directed to remove their construction over the surrendered land otherwise the Municipality would do it at their costs. Even by letter of consent dt. 24.2.96 (Ann. R2) the petitioner company agreed to the SDO Beawar & Commissioner Nagar Parishad Beawar for surrender of land in vicinity of Geeta Bhawan Road by removing Godown & superstructures latest by 29.2.96 for road alignment construction by vacating it for public purposes.

3.3 Admittedly, the Municipal Council, Beawar Filed a case No.1/79 before the Estate Officer, Beawar (SDO Beawar) for summary eviction from the land in dispute under the provisions of Rajasthan Premises (Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964 which are yet pending decision inasmuch as the predecessor of the petitioner Company had also filed a Revision Petition u/s 300 of the Rajasthan Municipal Act, before the competent authority for determination of the rent. Which too has been pending consideration.

4.1 In other appeal, claim of the petitioner Company is based on a sale deed in respect of land of free hold having been sold by Bihani Lal & others to West's Patent Press Company (P) Ltd. on 5.5.1925 as to total land measuring 8 bighas & 19 biswas in Khasra Nos. 960 & 961, which was subsequently alleged to have been sold by the West's Patent Press Company in favour of the petitioner Company by sale deed executed on 1.1.1972 for the land of free hold measuring 15,536 sq. yards. It is the case of the petitioner Company that it was having its possession over leased holder land measuring 21,931.22 sq. yards and free hold land measuring 15,536 sq. yards, which are situated nearby and their boundaries are adjoining with each others.

5. Further it is the case of the petitioner Company that no notice whatsoever was given for removal of any construction or material except the notice for 731.22 sq. yards of land out of total leased out land measuring 21,931.22 sq. yards, so also for free hold land.

5.1 Hence, a Civil suit was admittedly instituted by the petitioner Company on 29.2.96 for perpetual injunction, and so also for temporary injunction. However, temporary injunction was ultimately declined though initially the trial Court ordered to maintain status quo but after reply and written statement of the defendants, the order of status quo was vacated and temporary injunction application was dismissed, against which revision petition was filed but it was dismissed as withdrawn.

5.2 Therefore, on 3rd April, 1997 the Enforcement officers of the Municipal Council Beawar alongwith other officers of the District Administration in the form a Team are alleged to have reached the spot for demolition of the complete building, godowns and residential quarters of the petitioner Company but also took away the iron gates fitted on the boundary wall & tin sheets of the godowns, besides theraw & finished material lying therein.

6. Counsel for the appellant contended that the original lease

which was granted in favour of the Foreign Company which is not a party to the proceedings has handed over illegal possession to the petitioners and petitioners have no locus to challenge the proceedings. Other contentions which are raised by the counsel for the appellant are that there is no change, therefore, illegal possession in view of proceedings initiated for eviction before the Estate Officer is required to be allowed to proceed.

6.1 He has relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court:

(I) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & anr. vs. Dolly Das (1999) 4 SCC 450 wherein it has been held as under:

12. The lease had been granted with effect from October 1, 1969 in favour of M/s. Caltex (India) Ltd. and on coming into force of the Act on April 23, 1977 the appellant has stepped into its shoes and from that day onwards the appellant has been in possession of the same till now. The crucial question whether option for renewal either in terms of the lease deed or in terms of the Act had been availed of or not is the controversy between the parties now. Litigation between the parties has been going on from 1993 onwards. On expiry of the term the deed provides for renewal for two terms of 10 years each on the same terms and conditions except for enhancement of rent and execution of fresh deed modifying the clause relating to renewal. The appellant gave notice of renewal in terms of the provisions of (i) the deed in letter dated May 23, 1979, and (ii) the Act in the letter dated September 13, 1979. Now it is not necessary to examine the effect of renewal for the earlier period as even on appellant's own showing it is invoking the statute in the latter notice and not the terms of the deed. If that is so, the appellant could seek for renewal only in terms of Section 7 of the Act which enabled it to renew the deed for a period of one term as originally granted. Covenant for renewal is not treated as part of terms prescribing the period of lease but only entitles a lessee to obtain a fresh lease. Renewal of lease could only be for one term and no more, but nevertheless it could be contended that the covenant for renewal was also part of the lease and, therefore, stood incorporated in the renewed lease arising under the Act. However, in the peculiar facts of this case, we think that it is not necessary to enter upon the merits of the controversy regarding the effect of Clause 3(g) of the lease deed or the rights available under the Act for renewal of the lease period. We are of the opinion that ends of justice in this case will be met if we modify the order of the High Court in the following terms :-

(1) The appellant does not have power to claim exercise of option for any renewal of the lease beyond September 30, 1999;

(2) The appellant seeks for and is granted time to hand over vacant possession of the premises in question to the respondent on or before March 31, 2000, however, subject to filing of the usual undertaking in this Court within a period of four weeks from today;

(3) Rent payable is as per the terms of the lease deed, that is Rs. 1920/- per month which shall be paid till the date of handing over the vacant possession;

(4) If any arrears of rent, as stated above, has not been paid, the same shall be paid within a period of three months from today; and (5) The order made by the High Court to the extent it is inconsistent with our order shall stand set aside.

6.2 (II) State of U.P. and Others vs. Lalji Tandon (Dead)

through LRS., (2004) 1 SCC 1 wherein it has been held as

under**:**

14. The issue - whether a right to a new lease consequent upon the option for renewal having been successfully exercised should again contain the covenant for renewal, is not free from difficulty and has been the subject matter of much debate both in England and in India. It would all depend on the wordings of the covenant for renewal contained in the principal lease, the intention of the parties as reflected therein and as determinate in the light of the surrounding relevant circumstances.

15. A Division Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Syed Jaleel Zane v. P. Venkata Murlidhar and Ors., [MANU/AP/0112/1981](javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp() : AIR1981AP328 , wherein Jeevan Reddy, J., as His Lordship then was, spoke for the Division Bench makes almost an exhaustive discussion of the relevant English and Indian Law available on the point and we express our respectful agreement with the exposition of law as made therein. We note with approval the following proposition of law laid down therein:-

(i) In India, the law does not prohibit a perpetual lease; clear and unambiguous language would be required to infer such a lease. If the language is ambiguous the Court would opt for an interpretation negating the plea of the perpetual lease;

(ii) To find an answer to the question whether a covenant for renewal contained in the lease deed construed properly and in its real context, entitles the tenant to continue as long as he chooses by exercising the option of renewal at the end of each successive period of 5 years subject to the same terms and conditions depends on the deed of lease being read as a whole and an effort made to ascertain the intention of the parties while entering into the contract. No single clause or term should be read in isolation so as to defeat other clauses. The interpretation must be reasonable, harmonious and be deduced from the language of the document;

(iii) The Court always leans against a perpetual renewal and hence where there is a clause for renewal subject to the same terms and conditions, it would be construed as giving a right to renewal for the same period as the period of the original lease, but not a right to second or third renewal and so on unless, of course, the language is clear and unambiguous.

18. We find ourselves in full agreement with the view of the law taken in the decisions cited hereinabove. It is pertinent to note that the respondent is not claiming a lease in perpetuity or right to successive renewals under the covenant for renewal contained in the 1887 lease. The term of 50 years under the 1887 lease came to an end in the year 1937 and the option for renewal was exercised by the respondent as assignee of the original lessee which exercise was honoured by the lessor State executing a fresh deed of lease belatedly on February 20, 1945. This lease deed does not set out any fresh covenants, mutually agreed upon between the parties for the purpose of renewal. Rather it incorporates, without any reservation, all the covenants, provisos and stipulations as contained in the principal lease as if they had been herein repeated in full. Not only was a fresh deed of lease executed but the conduct of the parties also shows that at the end of the term appointed by the 1945 tease, i.e. in or around the year 1987, the lessor did not exercise its right of reentry. On the other hand, the respondent exercised his option for renewal. The officials of the appellant State, i.e. the Collector and the Board of Revenue, all recommended renewal and advised the State Government to expedite the renewal. The State Government was generally renewing such like leases by issuing general orders/instructions to its officers. At no point of time prior to the filing of the counter-affidavit, on the present litigation having been initiated, the State or any of its officers took a stand that the right of renewal, as contained in the principal deed of lease, having been exhausted by exercise of one option for renewal, was not available to be exercised again.

19. Lastly, it was submitted that the respondent is in breach of the terms of the lease and hence not entitled to renewal. Firstly, the High Court has held the plea taken by the appellant State not substantiated. Secondly, exercise for option for renewal cannot be stalled on the ground that the lessor proposes to exercise right of re-entry on account of alleged breach when no steps were taken for exercising the right of reentry till the option for renewal was exercised by the lessee. If the lessee is in breach and the lease entitles the lessor to reenter, that right is available to be exercised without regard to the renewal of the lease."

6.3 (III) In Saroj Screens Private Ltd. vs. Ghanshyam & Others

(2012) 11 SCC 434 wherein it has been held as under**:**

On coming to know of the aforesaid decision of the State Government, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed Writ Petition No. 3661 of 2001 and prayed that communication dated 12.6.2000 be quashed by contending that during the pendency of Writ Petition Nos. 1613 of 1992 and 1786 of 1996, there was no justification for according sanction under Section [70(5)](javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp() of the Act. Another plea taken by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was that the decision of the State Government and the Corporation was violative of Article [14](javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp() of the Constitution inasmuch as public property was transferred to the Appellant without conducting auction or inviting tenders so as to enable the members of public to participate in the process of grant of lease.

The issue deserves to be considered from another angle. Section [70](javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp() of the Act which contains provisions governing the disposal of municipal property or property vesting in or under the management of the Corporation reads thus:

70. Provisions governing the disposal of municipal property or property vesting in or under the management of Corporation.

(1) No nazul lands, streets, public places, drains or irrigation channels shall be sold, leased or otherwise alienated, save in accordance with such rules as the State Government may make in this behalf.

(2) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1), -

(a) the Commissioner may, (in his discretion), grant a lease of any immovable property belonging to the Corporation including any right of fishing or of gathering and taking fruit, flowers and the like, of which the premium of rent, as the case may be, does not exceed (One Lakh) rupees for any period not exceeding twelve months at a time:

(Provided that every such lease granted by the Commissioner other than a lease of a class in respect of which the Standing Committee has by resolution exempted the Commissioner from compliance with the requirements of this proviso, shall be reported by him to the Standing Committee within fifteen days after the same has been granted;)

(b) With the sanction of the Standing Committee the Commissioner may dispose of by sale or otherwise, any such right as aforesaid, for any period not exceeding three years at a time of which the premium or rent or both, as the case may be, for any one year does not exceed (One lakh) rupees;

(c) With the sanction of the Corporation, the Commissioner may lease, sell or otherwise convey any immoveable property belonging to the Corporation.

(3) The Commissioner may

((a) …)

(b) with the sanction of the Standing Committee, dispose of by sale or otherwise any moveable property belonging to the Corporation:

(c) with the sanction of the Corporation, sell or otherwise convey any moveable property belonging to the Corporation.

(4) The sanction of the Standing Committee or of the Corporation under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) may be given either generally for any class of cases or specifically in any particular case.

(5) The foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to every disposal of property belonging to the Corporation made under, or for the purposes of this Act:

Provided that-

(i) no property vesting in the Corporation in a trust shall be leased, sold or otherwise conveyed in a manner that is likely to affect the trust subject to which such property is held;

(ii) no land exceeding (five lakh) rupees in value shall be sold, leased or otherwise conveyed without the previous sanction of the State Government and every sale, lease or other conveyance of property vesting in the Corporation shall be deemed to be subject to the conditions and limitations imposed by this Act or by any other enactment for the time being in force.

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section the Commissioner may, with the sanction of the Corporation and with the approval of the State Government, grant a lease, for a period not exceeding thirty years, of a land belonging to the Corporation which is declared as a slum area under the provisions of the Maharashtra Slum Area (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 to a co-operative society of slum dwellers, at such rent, which may be less than the market value of the premium, rent or otherconsideration, for the grant of such lease, and subject to such conditions as the Corporation may impose.

The approval of the State Government under this Sub-section may be given either generally for any class of such lands or specially in any particular case of such land:

Provided that, the Commissioner may, in like manner renew, from time to time, the lease for such period and subject to such conditions as the Corporation may determine and impose.

6.4 (IV) Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke & ors. Vs.

Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr., (1995) 3 SCC 33

wherein it has been held as under:

15. Public purpose of removing traffic congestion was sought to be served by acquiring the building for widening the road. By orders of injunction, for 24 years the public purpose, was delayed. As a consequence execution of the project has been delayed and the costs now stand mounted. The courts in the cases where injunction are to be granted should necessarily consider the effect on public purpose thereof and also suitably mould the relief. In the event the plaintiffs losing ultimately the suit, they should necessarily bear the consequences, namely, escalation of the cost or the damages the Corporation suffered on account of injunction issued by the courts. Appellate court had not adverted to any of the material aspects of the matter. Therefore, the High Court has rightly, though for different reasons, dissolved the order of ad interim injunction. Under these circumstances, in the event of the suit to be dismissed while disposing of the suit the trial court is directed to assess the damages and pass a decree for recovering the same at pro rata against the appellants. .

6.5 He contended that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is required to be reversed and appeal preferred by the appellant deserves to be allowed.

7.0 Senior Counsel for the respondent Mr. Maloo has taken us to the order of the learned Single Judge and mainly contended that the learned Single Judge in his operative order has left it open to consider the application of the original respondent herein for renewal and thereafter, eviction proceedings will be initiated. The observations made by the learned Single Judge reads as under:

"Resultantly, these two writ petitions are allowed subject to the observations, referred to above and to the extent only that the respondents are directed to decide the petitioner Company's application (1) for renewal of the lease and for determination of lease rent due from 26.4.69 enhanced by Govt. under its sanction of renewal dt. 11.7.75 (Ann.5) considering earlier agreements covenants and its construction in accordance with law so also observations made herein above; and (2) the respondents are further directed to decide eviction proceedings initiated by them in the year 1979 and pending since then before the competent forum, including the interest on the arrears of lease rent outstanding against the lessee till date. All this exercise be completed within a period of three months from the receipt of certified copy of this order and it is expected that the parties to the applictions shall co-operate in the course of early hearing and decision of all the disputes pending adjudication since last two decades. In the meanwhile, the respondents are prohibited from taking the impugned possession otherwise than in

due course of law. However, the relief sought for in WP No. 2182/97 is left open to be adjudicated by the appropriate forum for which a liberty is given to the parties to avail of any remedy available in law as to the declaration or damages or reconstruction of the alleged demolitions in accordance with law keeping in view the observations referred to above. No order as to costs."

7.1 He contended that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is just and proper and no interference is called for. He denied all averments and allegations of lease deed and other points raised by the appellant.

8.0 We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

8.1. The fact remains that the original petitioners-respondent herein are in possession pursuant to agreement which was entered into between the original owner of the land, namely; the local authority and the Insurance Company which ultimately entered into arrangement.

8.2 No doubt, there is no agreement on record to establish that there is an arrangement between the present petitionersrespondent herein and the original lessee company. In that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge is right in observing as under:

"In our jurisprudence governed by rule of law even an unauthorised occupant can be ejected only in the manner provided by law. A course of legal proceedings according to the rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights. It is trite that due course of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the forum, authority or tribunal or court of law which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty or property in its most comprehensive sence; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of determination of the controvery by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of fact or liability, be conslusively proved or presumed against him. That being so, the courts have viewed with askance any process other than strict compliance of law as valid in dispossessing a person in occupation of immovable property against his consent."

8.3. The above observations are good law and the respondents are required to follow the rule. Apart from that while issuing directions, the learned Single Judge has directed them to reconsider the renewal in view of its sanction dt. 11.7.75 (Ann.5) considering earlier agreements covenants and its construction in accordance with law. In that view of the matter, in our considered opinion, the directions issued by the learned Single Judge reiterated above are to be complied with by the competent authority within a period of three months from today.

9.0 However, one of contention which has been raised by the appellant that petitioner-respondents are not paying any measne profits or anything from 1971 when the lease was renewed it was Rs. 750/- and land which was used is 21931 sq. yards after renewal.

9.1 In our considered opinion, the contention deserves to be accepted. The mesne profits is required to be ascertained and we hold that in 1971 when the lease agreement of land was renewed it should be Rs. 7500/- per annum and from 1999 where lease has expired the mesne profits would be paid @ Rs. 25,000/- per month from 1.7.99. The total amount directed as above to respondent company will be deposited within a period of three [SAW-1131/2002]

months from today.

9.2. With the aforesaid observations, the appeals stand disposed of. We make it clear that respondent will co-operative in the proceedings which will be initiated by the present appellant and will be decided within a period of three months after consideration of renewal application.

10. All the appeals stand disposed of. The contempt petition is also disposed of. Contempt notices are discharged.

A copy of this judgment be placed in each file.

(VIJAY KUMAR VYAS),J. (K.S. JHAVERI),J.

Bm gandhi/164-166