HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA AND HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY

WRIT APPEAL Nos. 2006, 2124,2173, 2189, 2191,2192, 2194, 2216, of 2003, 155 of 2004 and 1112 of 2005

DATED……………OCTOBER, 2013.

BETWEEN

The Director, Sri Venkateswara Institute of Medical Sciences, Tirupathi, Chittoor District.

……Appellant in WAs

And

K. Guravatih and ors

…..Respondents in all WAs

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA AND HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY

WRIT APPEAL Nos. 2006, 2124,2173, 2189, 2191,2192, 2194,

2216, of 2003, 155 of 2004 and 1112 of 2005

DATED……………OCTOBER, 2013.

COMMON JUDGMENT: ( per AM.J.)

In as much as common issue arises for consideration in

all these appeals, they are heard together and being disposed of by this common judgment.

The Director, Sri Venkteswara Institute of Medical Sciences, Tirupathi, has failed these appeals being aggrieved by the common judgment dated 8.8.2003 passed in Writ Petition Nos. 34422 of 1997, 32836 of 1997, 27959 of 1998, 33814 of 1997, 33422 of 1997, 33134 of 1997, 32952 of 1997, 33422 of 1997, 32741 of 1997, 27959 of 1998 whereby a learned single Judge of this Court held that the respondents are entitled for reinstatement in service with all attendant benefits, except back wages. It was further directed therein that feasibility of regularization of the services of the respondents in their respective cadres may be considered.

Brief facts of the case, shorn of unnecessary details, are as under:

Sri Venkateswara Institute of Medical Sciences (for short 'SVIMS') was established in the year 1992 with the aid and assistance of Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams ( TTDs). In the initial stages of establishment of the SVIMS, there were no sanctioned posts and therefore for smooth functioning of the establishment, the SVIMS engaged the respondents and others in the suitable posts such as Drivers, Laundry Workers, Supervisors, Helpers etc. According to the respondents, they were qualified and eligible to hold the respective posts and that they were continuing without any adverse remarks whatsoever and discharging the duties to the utmost satisfaction of their superiors. It is their case that though they are holding the

respective posts and discharging the duties on par with regular employees, yet the appellant-SVIMS did not consider their cases for absorption. Nevertheless, it is not their case that the appellant-SVIMS appointed them by backdoor method nor there is any contention that sufficient work was not there for them. While the things stood thus, the appellant-SVIMS discontinued the services of the respondents from 5.12.1997 and attached them to a named contractor purposefully to avoid them from absorption to respective regular posts and put them on regular pay scales.

That apart, a similar and separate Writ Petition No. 27959 of 1998 was also filed by the petitioners therein claiming that they are working on daily wage basis in the categories of Cooks, Workers for serving and cleaning, maid servants and sweepers with effect from February, 1994 in a canteen run by the appellant. It is their case that as they are working from the date of staring the canteen in the year 1994, they are entitled for regularization with effect from February, 1994. It is their further case that the TTDs in its Resolution No. 123, dated 30.4.1998/1.5.1998 took a decision to grant Rs.5.00 lakhs annually to the appellant-SVIMS towards their salaries and took over the administration of running the canteen by itself, by which, all the workers working in the said canteen, according to them, were under the administrative control of the TTDs. However, the TTDs has taken decision to withdraw the canteen from the appellant with effect from 1.11.1998 and decided to run the canteen by calling open tenders.

Aggrieved by the action of the appellant-SVIMS, in

discontinuing the respondents including the canteen workers and attaching them to a named contractor, they filed the aforesaid Writ Petitions.

It was the case of the respondents before the learned single Judge that they were appointed at the formative stage of the appellant-institution and when there were no regular posts, they were engaged on daily wage basis and even after regular strength was sanctioned, their case for absorption was not considered. It was also their case that even juniors to them were considered and absorbed into the regular sanctioned posts. It was their further case that the very nature of the works attended to by them i.e., driving, cooking, cleaning, sweeping etc., show that the same is perennial in nature and connected to the main activity of SVIMS and even though they are continuing for such a long time, the appellant terminated their services and attached to a named contractor, and therefore, continuing them as such is an unfair labour practice. It was thus their grievance that attaching their services to a named contractor amounts to termination of their services without notice and also altering the service conditions without any notice to them. It was therefore their case that they were entitled for absorption on regular basis and also pay scales attached to the posts held by said posts.

The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the SVIMS before the learned single Judge opposed the contentions of the respondents - workmen by stating that in view of the Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of Appointment to Public Services and Rationalization of Staff Pattern and Pay Structure) Act, 1994 (for short 'the Act 2 of 1994') the very

appointment/engagement of the respondents-workmen was illegal as the said Act prohibits engagement of daily wage workers. He contended that merely engaging a contractor and asking him to consider the case of the respondents herein for being engaged by him does not amount to termination under Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ( for short 'the ID Act'). He stressed that once the very engagement of the workmen (respondents herein) by the appellant was illegal, it must be deemed that the initial engagement was void ab initio and therefore they cannot not complain either termination of their services or alteration of their service conditions as contrary to the provisions of the ID Act.

Upon hearing the learned Counsel on either side and perusing the material on record, the learned single Judge while referring to the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply Vs. A.Rajappa (AIR 1978 SC 548) held that the SVIMS, which is a hospital or medical institute, is an 'industry' within the meaning of Section 2(j) as it is providing medical care, educational and research facilities of a high order in the field of medical science and functioning as a referral hospital apart from other functions. Inasmuch as the respondents are working in the appellant-SVIMS in various categories including as canteen workers, they are the 'workmen' within the meaning of the ID Act and as the respondents-workmen are being working years together, termination of their services, even otherwise attaching their services to a named contractor, also amounts to violation of the Section 25-F of the ID Act. The learned single Judge further opined that de hors the ID Act, the termination of the

respondents without issuing prior notice is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned Judge was also of the further opinion that the method evolved by the appellant-SVIMS attaching the respondents to a named contractor is unfair labour practice apart from being violative of Section 25F of the ID Act. Apropos the contention of the appellant that in terms of the provisions of Act 2 of 1994, the appointment/engagement of the respondents was illegal and as per Section 3(i) thereof, the appointment of any person in any public service to any post in any class, category or grade as a daily wage employee was totally prohibited, the learned single Judge while agreeing with the same observed that the appellant-SVIMS being a body established under law by the legislative body of the State did not invoke the provisions of the said Act to terminate the services of the respondents and on the other hand, in view of the sufficiency of the work, they were made to continue in their respective posts. Regarding the contention of the appellant-SVIMS that to avoid the rigor of provisions of the said Act, which would have resulted in termination of the services of the respondents, but only with a humanitarian approach, the respondents were attached to a contractor, the learned single Judge was of the view that attaching the respondents-workmen to a contractor without giving notice is in violation of Section 25F of the ID Act. Thus, the learned single Judge observed that the respondents were engaged in the year 1994 and their services were terminated in the year 1997 though the Act 2 of 1994 came into force with effect from 25 th November, 1993. Notwithstanding the same, nothing prevented the appellant from invoking Section 7 thereof in terminating the services of the

respondents by either giving one month notice or by paying one month's wages in lieu of notice, instead of attaching them to a named Contractor. But that was not done so by the appellant for the reasons best known to them. In those circumstances and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, as detailed supra, the learned single Judge thus concluded as stated supra. Hence, these appeals by the SVIMS.

The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellant-SVIMS, while reiterating the contentions as was advanced before the learned single Judge, contended that all the respondents herein were appointed as NMRs from the year 1994 onwards in different categories to undertake different works assigned to them and that they were neither sponsored by the Employment Exchange nor appointed through a public notification nor in regular vacancies and therefore such process of selection of the respondents is illegal and further Act 2 of 1994 prohibits such engagement. He pointed out that the respondents were engaged after Act 2 of 1994 came into force and as such when such engagement of respondents was contrary to the statutory provisions, they would not be entitled to any relief from this Court. The learned Additional Advocate General asserted that even according to Section 7 of Act 2 of 1994, the respondents who are daily wage employees appointed on temporary basis though continuing as such at the commencement of the Act should not be deemed to have a right to claim for regularization of their service on any ground whatsoever and services of such persons could be liable to be terminated at any time without any notice and without assigning

any reasons. Placing reliance on the decision of the judgment of the Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka Vs. Umadevi (2006(4) SCC 1), the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the Apex Court prohibited the regularization of all illegal appointments. He pointed out as to what the Apex Court held in para 43 of the aforesaid judgment that a person who was appointed illegally was not only aware of the terms of contract but also known about their rights and entitlement. Added to it, he pointed out that the Apex Court is prohibiting absorption or regularization of illegal appointments. While pointing out the distinction between the illegal appointments and irregular appointments in terms of the Apex Court decision stated supra, he submitted that all the respondents herein were illegal appointees and not irregular appointees. Further placing reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in Sathya Prakash Vs. State of Bihar {2010 (4) SCC 179} and State of UP Vs. Rekha Rani (AIR 2011 SC 1893)= (2011) 11 SCC 441, he reiterated that that the persons as like of respondents in the cases on hand who were appointed illegally have no right and hence they cannot seek regularization. Reliance was also placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in A. Manjula Bashini Vs. Managing Director, Andhra Pradesh Women's Cooperative Finance Corporation Limited {(2009) 8 SCC 431}, State of Karnataka Vs. M.L.Kesari {2010 (9) SCC 247) and State of Rajasthan Vs. Dayalal {(2011(2) SCC 429) and contended that the Government can formulate the schemes for regularization of temporary employees as and when such need arises and there cannot be any direction for formulating such schemes

repeatedly which would frustrate the very purpose of dealing with the legality of such exercise. Further placing reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in J &K Public Service Commission Vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan {1994 (2) SCC 630}, State of Bihar Vs. Ramdeo Yadav {1996 (3) SCC 493} and Santhosh Kumar Verma Vs. State of Bihar {1997 (2) SCC 713), he contended that the respondents cannot seek Mandamus to absorb in the regular posts and regularize their services in the appellant-SVIMS.

On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents-employees, reiterating the arguments as was advanced before the learned single Judge, submitted that when the appellant-Institute was in its formative stage and when there was no regular cadre strength available, the respondents were engaged in different suitable posts to run the administration of the appellant-institute smoothly. They pointed out that even after regular cadre strength was sanctioned, the appellant authorities instead of absorbing the respondents in the suitable posts who were qualified and eligible to hold their respective posts, did not consider their case for regularization/absorption. They pointed out that instead of absorbing the services of the respondents, the appellant terminated their services and thereafter attached their services to a named contractor, which is nothing but altering the service conditions and such termination of services is without issuing prior notice, which, nevertheless, could be said to be unfair labour practice. Under these circumstances, the learned single Judge considering the provisions of Act 2 of 1994 as well as the provisions of the ID Act, and also following the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in National

Thermal Power Corporation Vs. K.K.Shrivastava (2003 (97) FLR 1065, found that termination of the services of the respondents is in violation of Section 25F of ID Act and objective of Act 2 of 1995 and thereby rightly directed the appellant-SVIMS to consider the feasibility of regularizing the services of the respondents in the respective cadres by treating them as individual workers. They therefore submitted that there are no legitimate and substantial grounds to interfere with the well reasoned order of the learned single Judge. They ultimately prayed that these Writ Appeals may be dismissed.

Perused the material on record meticulously.

From a perusal of the material on record, it is not in dispute that the appellant has engaged the respondentsemployees in different and suitable cadres when the institute was in its formative stage and when there was no regular cadre strength available to it. It is also not in dispute that the appellant-SVIMS was established in the year 1992 with the financial aid and assistance of the TTDs. It is not in dispute that in the initial stage of the appellant, there were no sanctioned posts in the appellant-SVIMS. Though several similarly situated persons had been absorbed by the appellant-AVIMS and put them on time scale and some of them had been declared as approved probationers, however, it did not considered the cases of respondents for absorption. Notwithstanding the same, the appellant took steps to terminate the services of the respondents and attached them to a contractor from 5.12.1997 onwards.

Like wise, the appellant also started a canteen on 'no profit-no loss' basis and thereafter, it had withdrawn and started to run it by calling open tenders. Workers-employees working in different cadres in the said canteen were also asked to continue to work even after running the canteen by calling open tenders.

In the light of above facts and circumstances, the aggrieved employees-respondents preferred the Writ Petitions.

It is the contention of the appellant-SVIMS that as per Section 3(i) of the Act 2 of 1994, the appointment of any person in any public service to any post, in any class, category or grade as a daily wage employee was totally prohibited, however, to avoid the rigor of provisions of Act 2 of 1994, which would have resulted in termination of the services of the respondents, the respondents were attached to a contractor and the wages were paid through the said contractor. This is all because to avoid the rigor of Act 2 of 1994, to mean to say, on compassionate/humanitarian grounds. And further, though the Act 2 of 1994 came into force with effect from 25 th November, 1993 which prohibits engagement of daily wage labour, the appellant proceeded to engage the respondents. It is manifest from the material on record that nowhere in the Writ Petition it was stated that there was no sufficient work for the respondents to engage them on work. According to the appellant, to continue them in one way or the other and to wriggle out of the rigors of provisions of Act 2 of 1994, contractors were engaged and the respondent-workmen were attached to them and thereby it has concentrated on smooth running of the administration. In the light of the above, the appellant having such weapon in its

hands, did not used it to wash away the services of the respondents completely.

Thus, there is no dispute that all the respondents working in various capacities were thereafter attached to a contractor only with a view to the wriggle out rigors of the provisions of the Act 2 of 1994. It is also not in dispute that before the respondents were attached to the contractor, all of them have completed 240 days. Notwithstanding the same, in terms of Section 25F of the ID Act and as also, third proviso to Section 7 of the ID Act, before attaching them to a contactor by terminating their services, no notice or one month wages in lieu of notice was paid to them. It is not in dispute that all the respondents have worked for more than 240 days before their services were attached to a contractor after 5.12.1997 and since SVIMS is an Industry, attaching the services of the respondents to the contractor is nothing but termination of their services without following the due procedure as contemplated under Section 25 F of the ID Act and therefore such action of the appellant is not sustainable under the eye of law.

The so called termination of the respondents and subsequent attachment to a contractor was also fortified in view of the following perspective. It is not in dispute that in terms of the judgment of the Apex Court in Bangalore Water Supply Vs. A .Rajappa ( supra), the appellant-SVIMS is an 'industry' and all the respondents working in various categories including canteen are the 'workmen' within the meaning of the ID Act and as such termination of the respondents from service after completion of

240 days without prior notice is in violation of Section 25F of the ID Act. If really appellant-SVIMS wanted to terminate the services of the respondents, they would have invoked the provisions of Section 25F of the ID Act. Thus the action of the appellant-SVIMS without akin to Section 25F of the ID Act is also not sustainable under the eye of law.

Further more, the learned single Judge, in our considered view, applied with care and caution the doctrine of lifting of veil in industrial jurisprudence and recorded that in the contextual fact the respondents worked for more than 240 days, more so, years together, The attaching of the services of the respondents to a contractor on contract basis was thus a mere camouflage which could be easily pierced and the employer and employee relation between the appellant and respondents can easily be visualized. In Ram Singh Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh {2004(1) SCC 126}, the Apex Court was of the view that:

"In determining the relationship of employer and employee, no doubt 'control' is one of the important tests but is not to be taken as the sole test, in determining the relationship of employer and employee all other relevant facts and circumstances are required to be considered including the terms and conditions of the contract. It is necessary to take a multiple pragmatic approach weighing up all the factors for and against an employment instead of going by the sole 'test of control'. An integrated approach is needed. 'Integration' test is one of the relevant tests. It is applied by examining whether the person was fully integrated into the employer's concern or remained apart from and independent of it. The other factors which may be relevant are - who has the power to select and dismiss, to pay remuneration, deduct insurance contributions, organise the work, supply tools and materials and what are the 'mutual obligations'

between them (see Industrial Law -Third edition by I.T. Smith and JC Wood - at pages 8 to 10).

Normally, the relationship of employer and employee does not exist between an employer and Contractor and servant of an independent Contractor. Where, however, an employer retains or assumes control over the means and method by which the work of a Contractor is to be done it may be said that the relationship between employer and the employee exists between him and the servants of such a Contractor. In such a situation the mere fact of formal employment by an independent Contractor will not relieve the master of liability where the servant is, in fact, in his employment. In that event, it may be held that an independent Contractor is created or is operating as a subterfuge and the employee will be regarded as the servant of the principal employer. Where a particular relationship between employer and employee is genuine or a camouflage through the mode of Contractor is essentially a question of fact to be determined on the basis of features of relationship, the written terms of employment if any, and the actual nature of the employment….."

From the above decision it is clear that though there was no direct relationship between the respondents and the appellant-SVIMS, yet on lifting the veil and looking at the conspectus of factors governing employment, the naked truth is that the real employer was the SVIMS not the immediate contractor to whom the respondents were attached.

The above view was also fortified in view of the case law in Saraspur Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ramanlal Chimanlal & Ors. The question therein was whether the respondents engaged for working in the canteen run by the Co-operative Society of the appellant company were the employees of the appellant-Mills. The respondents initiated proceedings under Section 79 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 for payment of D.A. in

terms of the award of the Industrial Court. The appellant contested the claim on the ground that the respondents were employees of the co-operative society and not of the appellant. A two-Judge Bench of this Court approached the question from the point of view of statutory liability of the appellant to run the canteen in the factory and having construed the language employed in the definitions of "employee" and "employer" in Sub-sections (13) and (14), respectively of Section 3 of the Act, and the definition of "worker" contained in Section [2(i)](javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp() of the Factories Act and having referred to the Basti Sugar Mill's case (supra), held that even though in pursuance of a statutory liability the appellant was to run the canteen in the factory, it was run by the co-operative society as such the workers in the canteen (the respondents) would be the employees of the appellant above.

Thus on examining various factors and applying the effective control test, we are of the considered view that though there was no direct relationship between the appellant-SVIMS and the respondents, yet on lifting the veil and looking at the conspectus of factors governing employment, the naked truth, though draped in different perfect paper arrangement, was that the real employer was the appellant-management (SVIMS) and not the immediate contractor. Thus, merely engaging a contractor and asking him to consider the respondents for being engaged by him does not amount to termination of services nor altering the service conditions nor it indicates end of employee and employer relationship between the appellant and respondents.

The contention of the learned Additional Advocate

General made on behalf of the appellant is that all the respondents were appointed through back door method and they are all illegal appointments. He further contended that the respondents who were illegally appointed by back door method have no right to post and hence cannot seek regularization. The said contentions of the learned Additional Advocate General at threshold cannot be countenanced. It is not in dispute that all the respondents were appointed at the formative stage of the appellant-SVIMS, when there was no regular strength. The respondents were appointed as per need and for smooth running of the institution. Further, it is to be seen that from the inception of the appellant-SVIMS, the respondents were being continued in their respective posts in one way or the other. Through out the Writ Petition there is no contention that the respondents were appointed through back door method. Such contention was raised for the first time in these Writ Appeals, which cannot be accepted. Further, it is to be seen that it is not the case of the appellant-AVIMS that there is no work for the respondents. It is a fact that they were continued from 1992 to 15.12.1997, on which date they were asked to continue under a contractor. Mere terminating and thereafter attaching the services of the respondents to a named contractor does not amount to termination of services in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court discussed supra. Under various circumstances, for the contingencies urgent temporary appointments can be made for smooth running of the appellant administration. Such appointments obviously cannot be said to be per se illegal or irregular. While permitting the urgent temporary appointments, no guidelines have been provided under which, circumstances

or contingencies urgent temporary appointments can be allowed to be made or permitted to be made by the competent authority nor any procedure has been laid for urgent temporary appointment in various services which has been left to be governed by discretion of Competent Officer. Thus, contingencies under which lawfully an urgent temporary appointment can be made has been subjected to unfettered discretion of Competent Officer. Such appointments cannot be said to be illegal appointments, but rather merely can be said irregular appointments inasmuch as they have been made as per the needy.

In Ashwani Kumar and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors.( 1996 Supp. (10) SCR 120,) the Apex Court was considering the validity of confirmation of irregularly employed employees. It was stated:

"So far as the question of confirmation of these employees whose entry was illegal and void, is concerned, it is to be noted that question of confirmation or regularization of an irregularly appointed candidate would arise if the candidate concerned is appointed in an irregular manner or on ad hoc basis against an available vacancy which is already sanctioned. But if the initial entry itself is unauthorized and is not against any sanctioned vacancy, question of regularizing the incumbent on such a non-existing vacancy would never survive for consideration and even if such purported regularization or confirmation is given it would be an exercise in futility."

I n A. Umarani v . Registrar, Cooperative Societies and ors[{(2004)IIILLJ780SC}](javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp() , a three judge bench made a survey of the authorities and held thus:

"when appointments were made in contravention of mandatory provisions of the Act

and statutory rules framed thereunder and by ignoring essential qualifications, the appointments would be illegal and cannot be regularized by the State. The State could not invoke its power under Article 162 of the Constitution to regularize such appointments. This Court also held that regularization is not and cannot be a mode of recruitment by any State within the meaning of Article 12of the Constitution of India or any body or authority governed by a statutory Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Regularization furthermore cannot give permanence to an employee whose services are ad hoc in nature. It was also held that the fact that some persons had been working for a long time would not mean that they had acquired a right for regularization."

The Supreme Court in the Constitution Bench decision in the case of State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Uma Devi: (2006)IILLJ722SC itself noted in para No. 44 as under:

"One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases of irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa, R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra) and B.N. Nagarajan (supra) and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. Jn that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within a six months from this date. We also clarify that

regularization, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme"

In the light the of aforementioned case law on point, it therefore, appears to be well-settled that an irregular appointment may be regularized, but an appointment made in breach of statutory rules, law, or the constitutional provisions is not irregular but illegal and void. An illegal or void act cannot be regularised. Regularization does not connote permanency and, therefore, no person who claims to have been regularized can claim that he has been confirmed in service. Where regularization is permissible and the action which was irregular is cured, but the nature of the appointment remains the same. Thus, in the case on hand, the appellant Institute at the formative stage appointed the respondents for smooth running and under various circumstances, for the contingencies in which urgent temporary appointments can be made for smooth running of the appellant administration. Such appointments obviously cannot be said to be per se illegal or irregular. While permitting the urgent temporary appointments, no guidelines have been provided under which, circumstances or contingencies urgent temporary appointments can be allowed to be made or permitted to be made by the competent authority nor any procedure has been laid for urgent temporary appointment in various services which has been left to be governed by discretion of Competent Officer. In this view of the matter, the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that the respondents were illegally and irregularly

appointed and therefore their services cannot be regularized cannot be countenanced under the eye of law.

In the light of the above, it is pertinent to state, the employment of the respondents on ad hoc and temporary basis for such a long period cannot be appreciated. The Courts time and again have expressed their concern and anguish at such lethargy and inaction on the part of State functionaries. When persons fully qualified and eligible to be appointed on a particular post are held in such position for long periods and thereafter are attached to a contractor though asked to work in the original post, it causes serious prejudice to them as in the meanwhile they not only lose their opportunities to get selected through regular selection process but also in most of the cases get age barred.

The learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on voluminous case laws in support of his contentions. The fact remains that there is no dispute with regard to the ratio decidendi in the cases laws referred by the learned Additional Advocate General. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances involved in the cases on hand and in the light of the discussion made hereinabove those cases laws have no application to the facts of the present cases in toto.

A careful reading of the impugned order manifestly reflects that the learned single Judge considered all the aspects of the matter in the right perspective and rightly allowed the writ petitions. Having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in mind the law laid down by the Apex

Court in the above cited case, we do not find any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order which we uphold accordingly. Consequently we do not see any merit in the Writ Appeals which are liable to be dismissed.

In the result, the Writ Appeals are dismissed. Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions pending consideration if any shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

--------------------------------------------- JUSTICE ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA

--------------------------------------------- JUSTICE A. RAJASHEKER REDDY

Dated……….October, 2013. Msnro