HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD

MONDAY, THE SIXTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY THREE

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI

WRIT APPEAL Nos.36, 37, 41, 42, 43 and 44 OF 2023

WRIT APPEAL NO: 36 OF 2023

Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Preferred Against Order Dated 26.12.2022 in WP.No.43339 of 2022 on the file of the High Court.

Between:

1. The State of Telangana, Rep.by its Principal Secretary Home Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad.
1. The Director General of Police, Telangana State Hyderabad.
1. The Special Investigation Team, Headed by C.V.Anand, IPS, Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad.
1. The Asst. Commissioner of Police, Rajendranagar Division Rajendranagar, Hyderabad.
1. The Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad Police Commissionerate, Gachibowli, Hyderabad.
1. The Station House Officer, Moinabad Police Station.

...APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

AND

Tushar Vellappally, s/o. Vellappally Natesan Age: 54 yrs, Occ: Business President Bharath Dharma Jena Sena 2312 Vellappali 7 Mararikukulam North Panchayath, Ambalappuzha, Aleppey, Kerala 6885.

....RESPONDENT/PETITIONER

Shri K.Chandrashekar Rao, S/o Late K. Raghav Rao, Age 68 yrs., Occ: Chief Minister of Telangana and President of Telangana Rashtra Samithi Pragathi Bhavan, Begumpet, Hyderabad

1. B. Pilot Rohit Reddy, S/o Vittal Reddy, Age: Major, Occ: MLA Tandur Assembly, Ri/o Tandur, Vikarabad
1. The Central Bureau of lnvestigation, Rep. by its Director, New Delhi
1. Union of lndia. Represented by Secretary Department of Personnel Training NewDelhi - 110001
1. Ramachandra Bharathi Age: 33 yrs, Occ. Priest State. @ Satish Sharma KVK, S/o late N.Krishna I/1urthy, , RJo.Door No.22971, Sector 31 Faridabad, Haryana
1. Kore Nandaktrrhar Business, R/o. H.No @ Nandu, S/o Mr Shankarappa, Age: 48 yrs., Occ 32/3/4, Sai Nagar Colony, Chaitanyapuri, Hyderabad
1. D.P.S.K.V.N.Simhayaji, S/o late D.V-Ramana Rao, Age: 46 yrs., Occ: Priest, R/o. H.No.8-1-26'1A, Bharati Nilayam K.T. Road, Tirupathi, A.P State.

...RESPONDENTS

lA NO: 1 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in 5upp611 of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the order daled: 26.12.2022 in W.P.No.43339 of 2022.

Counsel for the Appellants: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI S.D. SANJAY TIWARI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR Ms. BANDARU HIMAVARSHINI

Counsel for the Respondent No.3: SRI GANDRA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

Counsel forthe Respondent No.4: SRI N. NAGENDRAN, S.C. FOR CBI

Counsel for the Respondent No.S: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

Counsel for the Respondent Nos.2, 6 to 8: -

WRIT APPEAL NO: 37 OF 2023

Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent preferred against the order dated 26.12.2022 in W.P.No.40733 of 2022 on the file of the High Court.

$\lambda$ (d)

1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Secretariat Building, Hyderabad.
The Director General of Police, Telangana State at Hyderabad.
1. The Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad Commissionarate, Gachibowli, Hyderabad.
1. The Asst. Commissioner of Police, Rajendranagar Division, Rajendranagar, Hyderabad.
1. The Station House Officer, Moinabad Police Station, Moinabad, Rangareddy District.

...APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

AND

1. Ramchandra Bharathi @ Satish Sharma V.K., S/o Late Krishnamurthy, Aged 33 Yrs., Occ: Priest, R/o. D.No.22911, Sector 31 Faridabad, Hariyana State
1. Kore Nandu Kumar @ Nandu, S/o Shankarappa, Aged 48 Years Occ: Business, R/o. H.No.2-321 3/A Sainagar Colony, Chaitanyapuri Hyderabad
1. D.P.S.K.V.N. Simhayaji, S/o Late D.V.Ramana Rao, Aged 46 Years, Occ: Peetadhipathi at Tirupati R/o.H.No.8-1-2614, Bharath Nilayam K.T.Road, Tirupati, A.P.

....RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS

1. The Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary, Dept. of Home Affairs, New Delhi.
1. The Central Bureau of investigation, Rep. by its Director, New Delhi.
1. Mr. Pilot Rohith Reddy, S/o. not known to the petitioner, aged major, occupation: MLA Tandur Assembly, R/o Tandur, Vikarabad District

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

IA NO: 1 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the order dated: 26.12.2022 passed by the learned single judge in W.P. No. 40733/2022, pending disposal of the writ appeal.

Counsel for the Appellants: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3: SRI D.V. SITHARAM MURTHY, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI M. V. V. BASWA RAJ

Counsel for the Respondent No.4: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

Counsel for the Respondent No.5: SRI N. NAGENDRAN, S.C. FOR CBI

Counsel for the Respondent No.6: SRI GANDRA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

WRIT APPEAL NO: 41 OF 2023

Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent preferred against the order dated 26.12.2022 in W.P.No.43339 of 2022 on the file of the High Court.

Between:

Pilot Rohith Reddy, S/o P.Vittal Reddy, aged 39 years, occupation: MLA Tandur Assembly, Plot No.66, Sri Lakshmi Nagar Colony, Manikonda Jagir, Hyderabad

...APPELLANT/RESPONDENT NO.8

AND

Tushar Vellapally S/o.Vellapally Natesan, aged about 54 years, occ: Business, President, Bharath Dharma Jena Sena 23-2, Vellapally, 7 Mararikukulam, North Panchayath, Ambalappuzah, Allepally, Kerala 688544

....RESPONDENT/PETITIONER

1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Secretariat Building, Hyderabad.
1. The Director General of Police, Telangana State at Hyderabad.
1. The Special Investigating Team, Headed by C.V.Anand, IPS., Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad.
1. The Asst. Commissioner of Police, Rajendranagar Division, Rajendranagar, Hyderabad.
1. The Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad Commissionarate, Gachibowli, Hyderabad.
1. The Station House Office, Moinabad Police Station, Moinabad, Rangareddy District.
1. Sri.K.Chandra Sekhar Rao S/o.late K.Raghava Rao, Aged about 68 years, occ: Chief Minister of Telangana And President of Telangana Rashtra Samithi, Pragathi bhavan Begumpet, Hyderabad.
1. The Central Bureau of Investigation, Rep. by its Director, New Delhi
'11. Ramchandra Bharahti @ Satish Sharma V.K. S/o Lale Krishnamurthy, Aged 33 Yrs., Occ: Priest, R:/o D.No.229'11, Sector 31 Faridabad, Hariyana State
12.Kore Nandu Kumar @ Nandu, S/o Shankarappa, Aged 48 Years Occ: Business, Fl/o.H.No.2-321 3/A Sainagar Colony, Chaitanyapuri Hyderabad
1. D.P.S.K.V.N.Simhaya.ii, S/o Late D.V.Ramana Rao, Aged 46 Years, Occ: Peetadhipathi at Tirupati R/o H.No. 8-1-2614, Bharath Nilayam K.T.Road, Tirupati, A.P.

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

lA NO: 1 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the order daled 26.12.2022 in W.P.No.4333912022, pending disposal of the writ appeal.

Counsel for the Appellant:

SRI GANDRA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

Counsel for the Respondent No.1 : SRI S.D. SANJAY TlWARl, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR M/S. BANDARU HIMAVARSHINI

Counsel for the Respondent Nos.2 to 7: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B-S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel forthe Respondent No.9: SRI N. NAGENDRAN, S.C. FOR CBI

Counsel forthe Respondent No.10: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

Counsel for the Respondent Nos.8 & 11 to 13: -

WRIT APPEAL NO:42 OF 2023

Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent preferred against the order dated 26.12.2022 in W.P. No. 40733 of 2022 on the file of the High Court.

Between:

Pilot Rohith Reddy, S/o P.Vittal Reddy, aged 39 years, occupation: MLA Tandur-Assembly, Plot No.6tj, Sri Lakshmi Nagar Colony, Manikonda Jagir, Hyderabad

...APPELLANT/RESPONDENT NO.8

AND

Ramchandra Uharahti @ Satish Sharma V.K., S/o Late Krishnamurthy, Aged 33 Yrs Occ.Pr est, R/o D.No.22911, Sector 31 Faridabad, Hariyana State
2 Kore Nandu Kumar @ Nandu, S/o Shankarappa, Aged 48 Years, Occ: Business, R/o H.No.2-321 3/A Sainagar Colony, Chaitanyapuri Hyderabad
1. D.P.S.K.V.N. Simhaya.ji, S/o Late D.V.Ramana Rao Aged 46 Years, Occ: Peetadhipathi at Tirupati R/o H.No. 8-1-2614, Bharath Nilayam, K.T.Road, Tirupati A.P.
1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Secretariat Bu lding, Hyderabad.
1. The Director General of Police, Telangana State at Hyderabad.
1. The Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad Commissionarate, Gachibowli, Hyderabad.
1. The Asst. Hyderabad Cornmissioner of Pollce, Rajendranagar Division, Rajendranagar,
L The Station House Office, Moinabad Police Station, Moinabad, Rangareddy District.
1. The Union of lndia, Rep. by its Secretary, Dept. of Home Affairs, New Delhi.

The Central Brrreau of lnvestigation, Rep. by its Director, New Delhi.

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

lA NO: 1 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed rn support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend lhe order daled 26.12.2022 in W.P. No.407 3312022, pending disposal of the writ appeaL

Counsel for the Appellant: SRI GANORA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

Counsel for the Resnondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3: SRI L. RAVICHANDER, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI M. V. V. BASWA RAJ

Counsel for the Resoondent Nos.4 to 8: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B,S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel for the Respondent No.9: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

Counsel for the Respondent No.10: SRI N. NAGENDRAN, S.C. FOR CBI

WRIT APPEAL NO: 43 OF 2023

Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent preferred against the order dated 26.12.2022 in W.P.No.43144 of 2022 on the file of the High Court.

Between:

$\sqrt{6}$

1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Secretariat Building, Hyderabad.
The Director General of Police, Telangana State at Hyderabad.
The Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad Commissionarate, Gachibowli, Hyderabad.
1. The Assistant Commissioner Police of Rajendranagar Division, Rajendranagar, Hyderabad.
1. The Station House Officer, Moinabad Police Station, Moinabad Rangareddy District

...APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

AND

Bhusarapu Srinivas, S/o Rajalingam, Age: 46 yrs., Occ: Advocate Fl/o. H.No.8-6-14912, Kothirampur Karimnagar. Presently residing at Flat No.1038, End ikose, Allaudd in County 'B' Block, Czech Colony, Sanathnagar, Hyderabad

....RESPONDENT/PETITIONER

1. The Union of India, Rep. by its Secretary, Department of Home Affairs New Delhi.
1. The Central Bureau of investigation, Rep. by its Director, New Delhi.
1. Pilot Rohit Reddy, S/o Vittal Reddy, Age: Major, Occ: MLA Tandur Assembly, R/o. Tandur, Vikarabad.
1. Ramachandra Bharathi @ Satish Sharma, KVK, S/o late N.Krishna Murthy, Age: 33 yrs, Occ: Priest, R1/o. Door No.22911, Sector 31 Faridabad, Haryana State.
1. Kore Nandakumar @ Nandu, s/o Mr.Shankarappa, Age: 48yrs, Occ: Business, R/o. H.No.2-32i31A, Sai Nagar Colony Chaitanyapuri, Hyderabad.
1. D.P.S.K.V.N.Simhayaji, s/o late D.V.Ramana Rao Age: 46 yrs., Occ: Priest, R/o. H.No.8-1-2614, Bharati Nilayam, K.T. Road, Tirupathi, A.P.State.
1. The Special Investigation Team (SIT), Headed by Sri C.V.Anand, Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City, O/o at Commissionerate, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad.

Rema Raieshwari Member SlT, Occ: Superintendent of Police, Nalgonda.
Kamaleshwar Shingenavar, Member SIT Occ: DCP (Crime), Cyberabad.

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

lA NO: 1 OF 2023

Counsel for the Appellants: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI V. RAM MOHAN REDDY

Counsel for the Respondent No.2: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

Counsel for the Respondent No.3: SRI N. NAGENDRAN, S.C. FOR CBI

Counsel for the Respondent No.4: SRI GANDRA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

Counsel for the Respondent Nos.5 to'10: -

WRIT APPEAL NO:44 OF 2023

Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent preferred against the order dated 26.12.2022 in W.P.No.39767 ot 2022 on the file of the High Court.

Between

1. The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Secretariat Building, Hyderabad.
1. The Director General of Police Telangana State at Hyderabad.
1. The Commissioner of Police Cyberabad Commissionarate Gachibowli Hyderabad.
1. The Assistant Commissioner of Police Rajendranagar Division Rajendranagar Hyderabad.
1. The Station House Officer, Moinabad Police Station, Moinabad, Rangareddy District.

...APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

$\overline{9}$

AND

$\Delta \overline{\partial} \Delta$

Bharatiya Janata Party Telangana, Rep. by its State General Secretary Mr. Gujjula Premendar Reddy S/o Gujjula Venkata Krishna Reddy, Age 59 years Occ: General Secretary BJP R/o 1-7-1259/E1 Siri Enclave, Advocates Colony, Hanamkonda, Warangal Telangana - 506 001.

...RESPONDENT/PETITIONER

1. The Union of India Rep. by its Secretary Department of Home Affairs New Delhi.
1. The Central Bureau of Investigation Rep. by its Director, New Delhi.
1. Mr Pilot Rohith Reddy, S/o. not known to the petitioner, aged major, Occupation: MLA Tandur Assembly, R/o. Tandur, Vikarabad District.
1. M. Rama Chandra Bharathi @ Satish Sharma S/o. Late M. Krishna
1. M. Kore Nandu Kumar @ Nandu, S/o. M. Shankar Appa, Occ: Business.
1. Mr. D.P.S. K. V. N. Simhayaji, S/o Late D. V. Ramana Rao

(Respondent Nos.5 to 7 are formal parties in this Appeal)

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

IA NO: 1 OF 2023

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the order dated: 26.12.2022 in W.P.No.39767/2022, pending disposal of the writ appeal.

Counsel for the Appellants: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI J. PRABHAKAR AND SRI C.DAMODAR REDDY, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI BALASUBRAHMANYAM KUMARSU

Counsel for the Respondent No.2: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

Counsel for the Respondent No.3: SRI N. NAGENDRAN, S.C. FOR CBI

Counsel for the Respondent No.4: SRI GANDRA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

The Court made the following: JUDGMENT

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI

WRIT APPEAL Nos.36, 37, 41, 42, 43 and 44 OF 2023

COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Ujjal Bhuyan)

This judgment and order will dispose of writ appeal Nos.36, 37, 41, 42, 43 and 44 of 2023.

$2.$ With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, all the writ appeals have been taken up for final hearing at the admission stage itself.

$3.$ All the writ appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated 26.12.2022 of the learned Single Judge disposing of writ petition Nos.39767, 40733, 42228, 43144 and 43339 of 2022.

$4.$ In the course of hearing, Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants argued writ appeal No.37 of 2023 arising out of writ petition No.40733 of 2022 as the lead appeal.

We have heard Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. B.S.Prasad, learned Advocate

General for the appellants in writ appeal Nos.36, 37, 43 and 44 of 2023; Mr. Gandra Mohan Rao, learned Senior counsel appearing for Mr. A.Prabhakar Rao, learned counsel for the appellant in writ appeal Nos.41 and 42 of 2023 and for respondent No.3 in writ appeal No.36 of 2023, respondent No.6 in writ appeal No.37 of 2023, respondent No.4 in writ appea-l No.43 of 2023 and respondent No.4 in writ appeal No.44 of 2023I de facto complainant; Mr. D.V.Sitharam Murthy, Iearned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. M.V.V.Basr.r,a Rao, Icarned counsel for respondent Nos.1,2 and 3 in vvrit appeal No.36 of 2023 (writ petitioners); Mr. L. Ravichar.rder, learned Senior Counsel appearing lor Mr. M.V.V.Basu,a Rao, learned counsel for respondent Nos.l, 2 and 3 in rnrit appeal No.42 of 2023 (writ petitioners); Mr. J.Prabhakar and C.Damodar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. Balasubrahmanyam Kumarsu, learned counsel for respondent No.1 . in writ appcal No.44 of 2023; Mr. S.D.Sanjay Tiwari, Iearned Scnior Counsel appearing for Ms. Bandaru Hima Varshini, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in writ appeal Nos.36 of 2O23 and 41 of 2023; Mr. Uda1,a Holla. learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. V.Ram Mohan Reddy, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 in u,rit appeal No.43 of 2023; Mr. Gadi Praveen I(umar. learned Deputy Solicitor General of India for Union of lndia ancl Mr. N.Nagendran, learned counsel for Central Btrrcau of lnvestigation (CBI).

Facts:

As notecl above, u,rit appeal No.37 of 2023 arises out of u,rit petition No.40733 of 2022. Writ petition No.40733 of 2022 was filed b.v responclent Nos.l, 2 and 3 as the writ petitioners seeking a declaration that the action of the State/ appellants herein rn undertaking biased and unfair investigation in F.I.R.No.455 of 2022 on the file of Moinabad Police Station rs illegal and arbitrar5r being in gross vioiatior-r o1' Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and als;o being oontrary to the settled principles of free and fair ir-r ve stigatio n . Consequently, a direction was sought for to transfer investigation in F.l.R.No.455 of 2022 on the lile o1' Moinabird Police Station to the Central Bureau of lrrr estigation (CBl) or alternatively to constitute a

Special Investigation Team (SIT) to conduct enquiry in crlme (F.I.R) No. 55 of 2022 registered on the file of Moinabad Police Station under the supervision of a sitting Judge to ensure investigation in a free and fair manner.

it ma1, be mentioned that F.l.R.No.455 of 2022 was registered on the lile of Station House Officer, Moinabad Police Station, C,l,berabad Police Commissionerate under Sections 120 B and 171-B read r.r.ith Sections 171-E, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) as well as Section B ol thc Prcvention of Corruption Act, 1988. F.I.R.No.455 of 2O22 u,as registered on the basis of the first information dated 26.lO.2O22 lodged by Mr. Pilot Rohit Reddy, responder.rt No.B in writ petition No.40733 of 2022. In the first information, Mr. Pilot Rohit Reddy stated that he is a Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) belonging to the Tela:'rgana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) party representing Tandur Assembly Corrstituency of Vikarabad District. On 26.09.2022 one Ramachar.rdra Bharati @ Satish Sharma from Delhi and one Nanda I{umar from Hyderabad, both belonging to Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), had met him.

They negotiat,:d with the informalt not to contest as a candidate frorn TRS party and to join BJP by resigning from TRS pariy. First informant was requested to contest the next clections from BJP for which he was offered would be given Central Government civil contract works ar'ld high Central Government positions for monetary benefits, thus luring him to join BJP. However, first ir-rformant u'as. u,arned that if he did not join BJP, tliere ri,ould bc cnminal cases and raids against him by Enforcement l)irectorate (ED)/CBI; besides, the Telalgzrna Government led by TRS party would be toppled. First informant st:Lted that since the above inducement amounted tc bribery lry adopting unethical and undemocratic means, in the process encouraging corruption an d polluting the body politic, he did not entertain such proposal. It was mentioned that on 26.10.2022. Ramachandra Bharati @ Satish Sharma ar-rd Nar-rda Kunrar again contacted first informalt and informed him that thev urere coming in the afternoon hours to his farm house located at Azeez Nagar, Moinabad for Rs.l00 crores. First informaxt was also assured that he

negotiations. First informant was also requested to mobilise some more TRS MLAs by offering them bribes of Rs.50 crores each to join BJP. They had a,lso induced the first informant and three other MLAs who came to the farm house to receive the offered amounts and to discharge their public duties in an improper arrd dishonest manner so that the Telalgana Government led by TRS party could be destabilised. First informant was informed that Ramachandra Bharati @ Satish Sharma of Delhi, Nanda Kumar from Hyderabad and one Simhayaji Swamy of Tirupathi would come to his farm house to finalise thc deal. Therefore, first informant requested the police authoritlr to take necessairy legal action against the above persons for indulging in unethical and undemocratic methods offering huge amounts as bribe.

Based on the above, F.I.R.No.455 of 2022 was rcgistered by the Station House Officer of Moinabad Police Station under the above mentioned sections.
In the writ affidavit, it was averred that allegations made in the first information were false and politically

a 8

motivated. The F.l.R. u,as registered by the police at the behest of the ruling TRS party

9.1. Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 stated in thc writ affidavit that poiitical motivation in lodging the F.l.R. is evident from the fact that even before the raid 'r.,,,as condr,rcted by the police, an offir:er of the rank of Commissioner of Police had addressed the media; the informant ard other MLAs rvere not only let free but were escorted to Pragatlri Bhavan i.e., to the oflicial residence ol the Chief Minister from the scene of the alleged crime. It was alleged that the Chief Minister, Commissioner of Police and MLAs belonging to the ruling party were involved in the conspiracy. No mate rial evidence were seized from the informar-rt arrd the three MLAs. Ail the lour MLAs were not subjected to any enquiry by the official re spondents.

9.2. Assistant Commissioner of Police, Rajer-rdranagar Division, Cyberabad Commissionerate sought for remand of respondent Nos.1, 2 ar.rd 3. First Additional Special Judge for SPE and ACB at Hyderabad (ACB Judge) held that since the alleged offences are under Sections 120,B

and 17 1-B read with Section I 7 1 -E and Section 506 read with Section 34 IPC arid Section B of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (briefly, 'the PC Act' hereinafter), the maximum punishment prescribed would be seven years. Therefore, guidelines of the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Biharl were required to be follou,ed; it was mandatory to issue notice under Section 41-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to respondcnt Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Hence, remand sought for respondent Nos.l,2 and 3 was illegal AS mandatory guidelines in Arnesh Kumar (supra) were not followed. Accordingly, ACB Judge declined the prayer of remand vide the order dated 27.1O.2022. Tlnrs came to be challenged by the State before this Court in criminal revision case No.699 of 2022. 81. order dated 29.10.2022, order dated 27.1O.2022 ol the ACB Judge was set aside by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Respondent Nos.l, 2 and 3 were directed to surrender before the police. Against this order, respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 preferred special leave petition before the Supreme Court.

I(20 r4) 8 scc 273

9.3. Respondent Nos. 1,2 an:,d 3 submitted that some audio tapes were released by the media wherein conversation of respondent No.B u,ith respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 could be heard. This c early shou,ed that the phones were tapped. Such tapping ol phones is unauthorised. In the circumstalces;, it r,vas allegcd that the manner in which investigation \ AS being carried out gives an impression that the sarrc \'as not l;eir-rg done in a fair manner and was done with a politrcal motive. Investigation was being conducted undcr the ckrse rnonitoring of the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Telangana for settling political scores. Investigation carried out \'as not done in a fair manner. Right of the rrccused for a fa,rir and unbiased investigation was compronrised. Thereforc, respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 sought for lranslcr ol' ir-rvestigation to CBI. In this connection, reliancc r,r,as placed on a number of decisions of the Suprerne Court. It u as prayed that the High Court should exercrse rts cxtraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Cc,r'rstitlrtiorr of lr-rdia and direct that the case be enquired into bv zr ncutral agency like the CBI or by a

Special Investigation Team to be monitored by a sitting Judge.

The writ petition was contested by the appellants who were arrayed as respondent Nos.1 to 5 by filing affidavit. The alfidavit was sworn by appellant No.4 i.e., Assistant Commissioner of Police, Rajendralagar Division, Cyberabad. Stand taken in the counter aflidavit was that learned Single Judge had initially granted stay of investigation but subsequently lifted the stay vide the order dated 08. 11.2022. This came to be challenged by Bharatiya Janata Par[, (BJP) before the Division Bench by filing writ appea,l No.749 of 2022. [r-r the meanwhile, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) was constituted by the Government oi Telangana vide G.O.Ms.No.63 of the Home (Legal) Department, dated 09.11.2022. SIT was headed by Mr. C.V.Anand, IPS, Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad City and consisted of the follou,ing six members:-
Mrs. Rema Rajeshsari, [PS, Superintendent of Police;

1/ 1l

Mr. Kalmeshrvar Shingenavar, IPS, Deputy Commissione;- of Police, Crimes, Cyberabad;
Mr. It.Jagadish"r,ar Reddy, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Shainshabad, Cyberabad;

t 'l:

Mr. I'l,Venkateshu,arlu, Superintendent of Police, Narayanpcl;
l\4r- B.Galgadl-rar, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Ri1 cnc ran agar Division, Cyberabad; and
Mr. [-axmi Redd1,, Station House Officer, Moinabad Poiice Station, Cyberabad.

10.1.In u'rit petition No.39767 of 2022 liled by BJP (Telangan:r), ir Single Judge of this Court passed an order dated 29.10 2022 deferring investigation till filing of counter aflirlavit by the State Government. In the mearrn,hilc, u nt petition No.40733 of 2022 came to be filed by respondcrrt Nos.l, 2 and 3 seeking investigation 1n crime No.,155 <tf 2022 by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) constitutecl lrr the Court or by the CBI. Both the u,rit petitions \'c rc l-reard together. By the order dated Oa .l 1 .202'2 , learned Single Judge took the view that

continuing with the embargo on investigation was not justified. Accordingly, the stay granted on 29.1O.2022 was lifted. Whereafter, Moinabad Police was allowed to go ahead with the investigation.

10.2 . Assailing the aforesaid order, BJP (Telangana) filed rvrit appeal No.749 of 2022. When writ appeal No.749 of 2022 was being heard, a copy of G.O.Ms.No.63 dated 09.11.2022 issued by the Principal Secretary to the Government of Telangana, Home (Legal) Department, 'as placed before the Court. By the aforesaid G.O.Ms.No.63, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) was constituted to irrvestigate crime No.455 of 2022 registered before Moinabad Police Station. The Division Bench vide the order dated I 5.11.2022 issued certain directions allowing SIT so constituted to proceed with the investigation but such investigation u,as directed to be monitored by the learncd Single Judge. Certain other additional directions ufere issued, such as, SIT should not report before al-, authority, poiitical or executive etc.

10.3. SIT had proceeded to investigate crime No.455 of 2022. Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 were taken into custody by the police for two days i. e., 10. Il .2022 and 11 . 1l .2022. Their application lor bail was dismissed b1' the Specia,l Court on 14.11.2022, whereafter they wc r(l lodged 1n Chanchalguda jail.

10.4. In the meanwhile, a Division Bench of this Court passed order dated 15.71.2022 in writ appeal No.749 of 2022 directing that SIT so constituted shall cond uct the investigation but the same r,,r.ould be undcr the direct supervision of the learnecl Single Judge. Certain additional directions were issued. Order dated 15.11.2022 was assailed by respondent Nos.l,2 and 3 before the Supreme Court by fiiing special leave petition.

10.5. Against the dismissal of bail application vide the order dated 1,+.17.2022, rcspondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 had filed criminal revision case No.699 of 2022 before this Court. By the order dated 29.1O.2O22, criminal revision case No.699 of 2022 u,as dismissed by a learned Single Judge. Against the aforesaid order, respondent Nos. l, 2

and 3 filed S.L.P. (Criminal) No.10356 of 2022 before th,e Supreme Court. By a common order dated 21.11.2022 Supreme Court disposed of both the special leave petitions by setting aside the order dated 29.10.2022 passed 1n criminal revision case No.699 of 2022 as well as the order dated 15.11.2022 passed in writ appeal No.749 of 2O22.

10.6. It was stated that in the course of investigation, investigation officer recorded the statement of the de facto complainant, drew up the scene of crime observation panchnama, seized pre-arranged electrical supply gadgets from the hall along with two voice recorders from the de facto complatnant. The seized materials clearly disclosed conversation of respondent Nos.1, 2 ar-rd 3 u,ith the MLAs offering Rs.50 crores to each of the MLAs besides other monetary benefits in the event of su,itching over to BJP from TRS. The recorded voice of respondent No.1 disclosed that respondent Nos. I , 2 and 3 had carried out similar defection in Karnataka and in other States. Voice recorders clearly disclosed that respondent Nos. l, 2 and 3 rvere in touch with high political functionaries of BJP.

10.7. During the investigation, respondent Nos.l, 2 and 3 remained siler-rt. Their mobile phones were seized. Print outs of screen shorts ald materials relating to the case were taken out and seized. Voluminous documents were found and seizecl containing information relating to Telangana politics and details of 50 MLAs of TRS. One diar5r found in the i ehicle of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was seized. The laptop u,as also scized.

10.8. Evidence collected drrring investigation reveals that respondent Nos.1 , 2 and 3 u,crc attempting to overthrow a democratically elt'cted govcrnment belonging to an opposition political part. bl adopting unconstitutional and undemocratic methods. Thus, respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 have hatched;e criminal corrspiracy with other conspirators to lure MLAs of TRS- As part of the crimina-l conspiracy, respondent Nc,s. 1 and 2 had started negotiations with the de facto complainant offerrrg to pay him Rs.1OO crores and Rs.50 crores t I ea<'h MLA u ho '"r,ished to shift to BJP lrom TRS. Respondr:nt Nos. I anrl 2 had intimidated the de facto complainant with raids by Enforcement Directorate (ED) and CBI if he did not accept the proposal.

lO.9. De facto complainant had shared the above information with three of his colleague MLAs, namely, (1) Guwala Bairaj, (21 B.Harshavardhan Reddy and (3) Rega l(arlta Rao. All of them came forward to assist the de facto complainant. Respondent Nos. 1 arrd 2 had contacted the de facto complainalt and informed him that they would visit his farm house along with respondent No.3 on 26.1.O.2022. At about 15. I O hours, respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 had reached the farm house of the de facto complainant at Azeez Nagar, Moinabad Mandal and started negotiations \r,ith the de factct complainant to finalise the deal. After some time, the other three MLAs arrived at the farm house and joined the meeting. In the course of the meeting, respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 had lured TRS MLAs to shift to BJP. At about 18.30 hours, respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 were nabbed, incriminating materials were seized and seizure panchanama was dran,n. Deponent stated that activities of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 prima facie disclosed offences punishable under Sections 120-B and 171-B read u'ith Section 171-8, 506 read with Section 34 IPC and Sectior.r 8 of the PC Act. After completing the formalities of arrest, respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were produced bcftrre the ACB Court. However, ACB Court refused to renand respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to judicial custodJr on the ground of violation of mandatory procedure under Section 41-A CrPC and ordered their release.

10.10. Aggrieved by the said order, State filed criminal revisiorr cerse No.699 of 2022 before this Court and a learned Single .lr-rdge of this Court by order dated 28.10.2022 directed respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to surrender belore lhe police and to produce them before the concerned magistrate.

10.1 1. Deponent had denied the allegation that rnvestrgatron u,as being done in an unfair and biased manner. Praver of rcspondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for transfer of investigation r o CIll or SIT was contested. Transfer of investigation clnnot be a routine exercise and can be done only in exceptir)ltal circum stances.

10.12. Government of Telangana had issued G.O.Ms. No.5i dated 30.O8.2022 withdrawing all previous general consents issued for entrusting investigation to CBI. Voluminous evidence had been gathered. Role of each and cvery person in the conspiracy was being examined. Suspects \ryere put on notice under Section 41-A CrPC.

10.i3. Therefore, it was contended that the writ petition u,as devoid of any merit ald should be dismissed.

11. As already noticed above, similar writ petitions werc liled u'herein identical counter aflidavits were filed by the State.

During the pendency of the related writ petitions, a press meet was organised by the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Teiangana on 03.1 l.2022.In the press meet, he stated that voluminous evidence was collected in the criminal case and those \rcre being sent to va-rious constitutional functionaries across the country like Chief Justice of India, Chief Justice of High Courts, Judges, Chief Ministers etc.

i3. Learned Single Judge summed up the sequence of events relevant for adjudication of the writ petitions in the follor.r'ing man'rer:

F.l.R. No.455 of 2O22 was registered on 26.1O.2022, on thc complaint lodged by Mr. Pilot Rohit Redy, M.L.A.. Tandur Assembly Constituency of Vikarabad belongrng to TRS Party at 11.30 hours, by the Station House Officer, Moinabad Police Station.

Observation Panchanama were commenced on 26.10.2022 at 12:30 hours and concluded at 14:30 hours wherein four (4) electronic spy gadgets werc installed in the farmhouse of the de facto complainant Mr. Rohit Reddy at Moinabad by ACP, Rajendranagar. Apart lrom that two voice recorders were provided to t}re de fado complarnalt for recording conversation with the accused. These are in the nature of 'Pre Trap Proceedings'.

Sei:;ure proceedings/panchanama were dra-fted on 26.10.2022 at 19:00 hours and concluded at OU:30 hours on 27.10.2022 wherein electronic spy gadgets with video recordings (C- I to C-4), voice recorders (C-5 ald C6), mobile phones of the accused (C 7 to C- 1O), Laptop of the accused (C-11), documents, diary etc., in made up Iiles and Hyttndai Creta Car (C- 12) were seized.

On Courl 29.).0.2022 in W.P. No.39767 of 2022. this passed order deferring the investigation till

counter is frled. 04.1t.2022. The matter was adjourned to

Press Meet was addressed by the Honble the Chief Minister or 03. 7 1.2O22.
The order of this Court dated 29.10.2022 in W.P. No.39767 of 2022 deferring investigation was vacated by the order dated 08.11.2022.
The Honble Chief Minister has circulated rccorded videos of the trap proceedings in CDs ar-rd pcn drives to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of lndia, Honblc Judges of the Supreme Court, Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court of Telangana State and other Statcs and many constitutionai functionaries all over the country.
W.A. No.749 of 2022 was filed by the accused persons challenging the order of this Court dated Oa.Ll.2022 in W.P. No.39767 of 2022.
During hearing of writ appeal, Mr, Dushyar.rt Dave, learned senior counsel, has expressed regrcts on behalf of the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Telangana State for sending the recorded videos to verious constitutional functionaries.
By the order dated 15.11.2022 in W.A. No.749 of 2022, Divrsion Bench directed this Court to monitor investigation of the SIT in FIR No.455 of 2O22 frorn time to time.

11.The accused persons approached thc Hontle Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Criminal) No, 10356 of 2O22 challenging tle order in W.A. No.749 ot 2022.

12.The order of another learned singie Judge of this Court 1n Criminal R.C. No.699 of 2022 (setting aside order of the trial Court refusing to accept remand) was also challenged by the accused persons before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

Common order d:rted 21.1L.2O22 was passed by tJ e Honble Supremc Court in S.L.P. (Criminal) No.10356 of 2022 and Diary No.37248 of 2022 holding that observations madc bv the learned single Judge in Criminal R.C. No.699 of 2022 are contrary to the judgment in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar ((2014) 8 SCC 273). Thc order passed in W.A. No.749 of 2022 was set aside b,l' rlirr:cting this Court to pass final orders in the writ petition seeking transfer of investigation.
After considering thc rival pleadings and submissions as well as the judgmer.rts cited at the bar, learned Single Judge framed issues for cor-rsideration, including the issue as to whether Bharatilir Jirnata Party (BJP) has got locus standi to institute writ petitiorl No.39767 of 2022. After due consideration and placing rcliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Romila Thapar v. Union of Indiaz it was held that a third party cannot lrt,permitted to espouse the cause of the accused rvhen thc ac cused themselves a-re pursuing

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the writ petition. Following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Romila Thapar (supra), writ petition No.39767 of 2022 r.r.as held to be not maintainable and was accordingly dismissed.

Insofar writ petition No.4O733 of 2022 is concerned, the same was allorved by the learned Single Judge by holding as fol1ou,s:-
FIR discloses commission of cognizable offence and investigation is bound to bc done in accordance with law. Police excesscs, invcstigation olficers acting unusually and beyond jurisdiction violating judicial precedents can be remedicd from time to time and rightly so, orders have becn passcd by this Court ald other Benches of this Court granting interim protection of arrest pursuant to Section 41-A of Cr.P.C notices. It is stated that accused Nos.l to 3 are released on bail. So far as other accused, against rvhom Scction 41-A of Cr.P.C. notices were issued, are conccrned, it is stated that stay has been grantcd by other Bcnches of this Court in separate cases. Thus, it cannot be said that any prejudice is caused to the accused on the aspect of violation of provisions of law, more particularly, Section 41-A Cr.P.C and judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar l(2O 14) 8 SCC 273).
The u,ords spoken by the Honble Chief Minister ald agony expressed repeatedly say-ing that democracy is being murdercd and several other slatcments imputing the top leaders of the B,JP in the contemporary political scenario zrre nothing unusual. With a conscious mind this Court refi'ains to make any further observations on the speech of the Hon'ble Chief Minister, though the same has becn rcpeatedly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, by keeping in mind the prejudice that may cause to the de facto complainzrn t/ victims.
In the abovc conspectus, the issue boils down to the third folder of CD/Pen Drives, which have been taken or-r recorcl by this Court and circulated by the Chief Minister to the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, the Hon'b1e Chief .lus,,ice of this Court and the Hon'ble Chief Justices of otfrer States. The controversy regarding poaching of MLAs is, no cloubl, a serious one. The official press confcrence arranged by the Chief Minister and speaking about th€ sequence of events afld the attempt made to poach ruling party MLAs is understandable. What is required to bc scen is whether the procedure established by law has been brcached. The manner in which the video recordings through electronic spy gadgets and the documents (C-1 to C-6) have been uploaded in the pubiic domain tested on the view point of accused would certainll' cause prejudice to them. Though the investigairon is at the preliminary stage, crucial documents, which w'crc in the nature of pre-trap procecdings. have come out open in public.
None of the learned counsel appearing for the State have clarificd or explained to the Court as to how these CDs :rnd pen drives had surfaced in the Press Meet of the Hon'blc Clricf Minister. Not only in the pleadings,

even in the oral submissions, the respondents have maintained stoic silence and have chosen to be very cautious on the leakage of investigation material. A veiled attempt was made by the learned Additional Advocate General stating that the de facto complainant might have handed over the CDs/pen drives to the Hon'ble Chief Minister.

Mr. A. Prabhakar Rao, learned counsel appearing for the de facto complainant - respondent No.S in W.P. No.39767 of 2022, has also stated that the de facto complainant might have handed over the CDs, but there is no clear assertion and evidence to that effect. The contentiorls of Mr. J. Prabhakar, learned senior counsel appearing for one of the petitioners, with reference to procedurc of search and handing over only the list of documcnts Io the de facto complainant under Cr.P.C. and instructions in the Police Manual have not been controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents. Moreover, nothing is argued before this Court as to at what stage and under what provisions of Cr.P.C., the de /acto complainant could have access to the documents and material seized during the investigation. The crime was rcgistered on 26.10.2022. The electronic spy gadgets were seized on 26/27 .1O.2O22 containing the video recording (third file) which are in the nature of trap proceedings, and undoubtedly crucial and critical part of investigation, should not have been handed over to any third party. In the political tussle between the BJP and the TRS Party, thc constitutiona-l and statutory rights of thc accuscd seems to have been forgotten. The invcstigation officers have committed serious lapses. It appears, to cover up such lapses, SIT was constitutcd on

09.1,1.2022. When accused are condemned publicly and branded as conspirators levelling serious allegations by none other than the Hon'ble Chief Minister by conducting Press Meet and circulating the videos to the important constitutional functionaries, even before charge sheet is filed and at the initia.f stages of ttre investigation, it cannot be said that investigation is being done in an unbiased and fair manner.

4i. As contended by Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, learned scnior counsel, in W.P. No.40733 of 2022, actual bias need not be proved and it would sufhce if legitimate and reasonable apprehension of bias, taint and unfair investigation is made out by the accused. In Babubhai v. State of Gujarat ((2O1O) 12 SCC 254), investigation was transferred. In the said decision, it was held that not only fair trial but investigation is also part of constitutional rights gu aranteed under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitutjon of India. It is not necessary that actual bias should be proved and issue has to be exarnined from the view point of the accused to see whether any prejudice is caused or not. However, apprehension of the accused about unfair and biased investigation should not be unrealistic but genuine as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Gujarat ((2018) 17 SCC 627). ln the instant case, the events which have unfolded from the date of registration of crime on 26.10.2022 Ltll the Press Conference of the Hon'ble Chief Minister on 03. I 7.2022, making the investigation CDs/ material public without any hesitation would cause reasonable apprehension in tJ-e mind of the accused about fair and unbiased investigation.

In these circumstances, this Court is of the view that serious prejudice is caused to the accused, who are branded publicly as conspirators, thereby, depriving their rights to effectively defend the criminal proceedings and availing their legal remedies under law. These events run contrary to the fundamental concept of criminal law jurisprudence that every accused is deemed to be innocent until proven guilty. As noted above, the learned counsel for the respondents have not pointed out any provisions of the Cr.P.C. nor offered any plausible explanation or theory as to how the third video CDs/pen drives which have been seized under mediators' report panchanama on 27.70.2022 in F.I.R. No.455 of 2022 have been handed over to the Hon'trle Chief Minister. Who has handed over the same, when and how, remains a mystery. In spite of that, to say that no prejudice is caused to the accused is unreasonable and unacceptable. If action of the police is not in accordance with the procedure establishcd by lau., even at the initial stages, this Court, exercrsing jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not shirk its responsibility to set rights things. The contention of the learned counsel for the State - Police that the petitioners have remedies under lau, and they may challenge the proceedings at the appropriatc timc and the investigation at tJ:is nascent stage should not be interfered cannot be sustained. The rights of the accused stand at a high pedestal in the criminal law jurisprudence as held by tl-.e Hontrle Supreme Court in Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra ((2019) 15 SCC 470). Having found serious lapses alrd leakage of inr.estigation material/CDs, it is dillicult to accept the contcntion of the lezLrned counsel for the respondents - Statc th:rt this Court should lay off its hands merely because the investigation

is at preliminary stage. Rights of the accused to have fair and unbiased investigation a,rc defeated in this case which is in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

In thc opinion of this Court, constitution of SIT under G.O. Ms. No.63 u,hich act under the Government will not alter the situation, more particularly, when al authority none other tharl the Hontrle Chief Minister himself has openly circulated the videos and branded the accused and members of the organised crime as conspirators. The cntirc episode and turn of events is somet}ing unprecedented and incomprehensible and unhesitatingly, this Court holds that the accused have made out a case for t ransfcr of investigation. So far as other points raised bl' thc learned counsel regarding violation of G.O. Ms. No.268 ctc., arrd that investigation by regular police is not permissible under the PC Act a.re not considered as the plcadings to that effect in the writ affidavits are very r,ague, in any event, these are not necessary to be dealr with in the light of the above observations.
Finally b1,' the impr-rgned judgment and order dated 26.12.2022, learned Single .Jr,rdge quashed G.O.Ms.No.63 issued by the Home (Legal) Dcpartment dated 09.11.2022 appointing SIT. Learncd Single Judge directed that investigation in F.l.R.No.-*55 of 2022 shall be forthwith trarrsferred to CBI u,hich shall proceed u,ithl de nouo investigation in F.l.R.No.-l 35 ol 2O22. Learned Single Judge

also quashed the investigation carried out in F.l.R.No.455 of 2022 till date. In the process, learned Single Judge allowed writ petition No.40733 of 2022 and two other writ petitions. As already noticed above, r.r,rit petition No.39767 of 2022 was dismissed as not being maintainable. Further, in view of the above orders, learned Single Judge observed that no additional order was required to be passed in writ petition No.42228 of 2022; accordingly, the said writ petition was closed.

The present batch of writ appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated 26.12.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid vvrit petitions. Interestingly, writ appeal No.44 of 2023 has been filed by the State against the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dismissing writ petition No.39767 of 2022. It is not understood as to hou, the State cal be said to be aggrieved by dismissal of the said q,rit petition and therefore how the ',r,rit appeal is maintainable.

Sub missions:

Before I\lr. Dushl'ant Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in writ appeal No.37 of 2023 could make tris submissions, Mr. D.V.Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 raised a prelirninarl, objection as to maintainability of the writ appeal. According to him, learned Single Judge had passed thc order in a matter relating to criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, having regard to the mandate of Clause 15 ol I he Letters Patent, writ appeal would not be maintainable
Mr. Duslrvanl Deu.e. at the outset has referred to the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge in detail. According to l-irn, Hon'blt' Chief Minister of Telagnana was not joined as a part-v rcspondent in the said proceedings. Hon'ever, u'ild and vaguc arllegations were made against the Hor-r'ble Chiel Minister. Referring to the directions of the learned SingL: Judge l1) quashing constitution of SIT, further quash ir-rg ir-rvesl ig:Ltion carried out by SIT and thereafter dirr'cting that irrvestigation be carried out by

CBI, he submits that those are extraordinary directions. Such directions are totally uncalied for and unwarranted since there \ras no material before the learned Single Judge to tralsfer investigation to CBI. He submits that directing transfer of investigation from a high powered Special Investigation Team (SIT) constituted by the State Government to the CBI cannot be done in a routine manner. There is nothing extraordinar5l in this case to justify transfer of investigation. According to him, learned Single Jurdge had himself observed at various places of the judgmer-rt that holding of press conference by the Hon'trle Chief Minister cannot be construed to be an interference in investigatior-r. It is a legitimate political activity. Chief Minister of a democratically elected government has every elected government is under the threat of being overthrown by undemocratic methods. Insofar the third CD/pen drive is concerned, the contents thereof pertain to the conversation of the accused with the de facto complainant and others. Those materials r,r,ere aiready in the public domain. Merell, because these materials in the form of right to tell the people as well as his electorate that his

CD/pen drivr rvere sent by the Hon'ble Chief Minister to various const itutional functionaries would not vitiate the investigation bv SIT to warrant transfer of investigation. He further submits that crime No.455 of 2022 arises out of trap proceedings. The accused were caught red-handed. Therefore, thr:re is nothing so sacrosanct in the CD/pen drive that circulation of the same wouid vitiate the investigation carried out, those materials alreadl, being ir-t tl-re public domain, and therefore, there can be no valid reason tl-rat tlrc investigation should be handed over to the CBI. Direction of the learned Single Judge to transfer investigation to CBI is all the more baffling because learned Senior Counsel for respondent Nos. l, 2 and 3 himself had given up the prayer for handing over of investigation to CBI.

19.1.Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel has taken the Court to various grounds of appeal lncluding thc jr-rdgments relerred to thereunder. Whiie taking the Court to the grounds of appeal, learned Senior Counsel has rcferred to lhe decision of the Supreme Court in Mohinder

Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner3 to highlight the importance and significance of democracy. His submission is that parliamentary democracy is a basic structure of the Constitution of India. Therefore, trying to bribe and lure MLAs to change political loyalty is a complete antithesis to democratic principles and subversive to parliamentary democracy.

19.2. Insofar plea of mala fides/motive being attributed to the Hon'ble Chief Minister, he submits that mere allegations or suspicions would not be sufficient. Person against whom mala fide is attributed is a necessary party to the proceedings. Such a person must be put on notice and heard. In this connection, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab4.

19.3. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu5, he submits that burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who

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alleges it. Allegation s of m.ala fides are often easily made than proved. The very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high ordcr of credibility.

19"4. None of the above aspects rn,ere considered by the learned Single Judge u,l.rile directing transfer of investigation

19.5. In the course of his submissions, Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned Senioi Counsel h:Ls also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Colrrt in H.N.Rishbud v. State of Delhio. Referring to the said j udgment, u,hich dealt with investigation under the Preverrtion of Corruption Act, 1947, as well as under the Criminirl Procedure Code, 1898, he submits that Supreme Court considered the question as to whether trial proceedings initiated on charge sheets which were Illed on the basis of farrltr, investigation u,ere legal and provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, Supreme Court held that trinl follorvs cognizancc and cognizance is preceded by investigation. A defect or illegality 111 required to be quashed. After referring to various

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investigation, howsoever serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. An irregularity committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial. Result of the tria,l which follows such investigation cannot be mechanically set aside unless illegality in the investigation car-t be shou,n to have brought about miscarriage of justice.

19.6. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel contends that it is trite law that poiice has a statutory duty to investigate. Court should not interfere in such investigation except in rarest of the rare cases. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Prakash P. tlindujaz, he submits that the legal position has been settled by judicia-l authorities that the court would not interfere with the investigation or during the course of the investigation which would mean that from the time of lodging of F.l.R. till submission of report by the officer in charge of the police station in the court under Sectior-r 17 3(2\ of th,e CrPC, this field is exclusively reserved for the investigating

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agency investigation irnd place it before the court; it is the criminal court which u-i1l decide the truthfulness of the accusations on the basis of evidence gathered by the police during accuse d will have zidcquate rr:medy by seeking discharge or quashing of proceedings, if the accused is of the belief that he is being unncccssarily entangled in a crimina-l case. It is the duty of thc' police to collect evidence in the investigation. Throughout the criminal proceedings, the

19.7. Adverting to the prcliminary objection raised by Mr. D.V.Sith:Lram Murthl-, Mr. Dushyant Dave submits that the u'rit appeal is clearly maintainable. Writ petition was filed seeking a u,rit of mandamus. Learned Single Judge has issued ;L u:'it of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitutirr-r of India on tl-re grievance expressed by the writ petitioners that their- fundamental right to a fair investigation and rcpr-rtat ior-r under Article 21 of the Constitution ,rf lr-rdia u-as l;eing breached by the State. Therefore, agair-rst such iln order of learned Single Judge, writ appeal is clcarl-r' maintainable. Learned Single Judge ...-- had not exercised criminal jurisdiction. If it is contended

that learned Single Judge had exercised criminal jurisdiction, then proceedings before the learned Single Judge would be a nullity in as much as, as per roster learned Single Judge did not have criminal jurisdiction. If this is the stand of the respondents in appeal, the same would be equally applicable to the writ proceedings on the basis of vvhich rvrit petitioners would be non-suited. Therefore, it 'uvould be too farfetched to contend that learned Single Judge had exercised criminal jurisdiction because of r.r'hich u,rit appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent u'ould not be maintainable.

Mr. Gandra Mohan Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for thc de facto complainant, respondent No.6, who was respondent No.B in the writ proceedings, submits that no notice r,r,as issued by the learned Single Judge to tlre de facto complainant. Non-issuance of notice to the de facto complainant is a material irregularity which has vitiated thc judgment of the learned Single Judge. He has elaboratcly referred to the contents of the first information and subrnits therefrom that the de facto complainant was

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very much a necessary pa,rty to the writ proceedings. In fact, the scenr: of the crime was at his farm house located at Azeez Nagar, Moinabad

20.1. Referring to paragraph 19.2 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, he submits that date of the judgment is 26.12.2022 and on the very same day, Iearned Single Judge had allowed I.A.No.2 of 2022 in W.P.No.43 144 of 2022 takirrg on board the video recording uploaded in the additional evjdence. No opportunity was granted to the contesting parties to have their say in I.A.No.2 of 2O22. This is a gross procedural irregularity committed by the learned Sir-rgle Judge. CD in three separate files/folders by treating them as

2O.2. Adverting to the contents of the CDs, more particularly to those described in paragrapl'r 20.3 of the judgment, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.6 submits tl-rat those materia-ls were already in the public domain. Therefore, reference made to it by the Hon'ble Chief Minister or circulating those materials bly the Honbie Chief Mir-rister cannot be faulted. Hon'blc Chief Minister

had highlighted the issue that what has happened in the present case is not a solitary instance or a minor attempt at bribery. It is a threat to democracy itself, seeking to overthrow a democratically elected government through bribes and intimidation.

20.3. Insofar handing over of investigation to CBI is concerned, learned Senior Counsel submits that even the u,rit petitioners were not specific about a CBI enquiry. He submits that Mr. Mahesh Jethma-lani, learned Senior Counsel who had appeared for the writ petitioners/ respondent Nos. 1 , 2 and 3 herein had categoricall.l, submitted before the learned Single Judge which has been recorded in paragraph 10.5 of the judgment that the u,rit petitioners were not insisting that there should be investigation only by CBI; it was submitted that lcarned Single Judge may exercise discretion and transfer the invcstigation to any other agency.

2O.4. Finding fault with t1le decision of the lean-red Single Judgc in entrusting the investigation to CBI, learne c1 Senior

Counsel for respondent No.6 seeks setting aside of the aforesaid order of the learncd Single Judge.

21. Mr. D.V.Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel has appeared on behalf of respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 i.e., the writ petitroners. Reiterating the preliminary objection raised by him at the threshold, he submits that the writ appeals are not maintainable. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryara8 in support of the aforesaid contention. Before taking thc Court to the aforesaid decision, he has referred to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Telangana High Court. He submits that considering the limited scope and ambit ol Letters Patent appeal, no such appeal u'ould lie against the order passed by the learned Single Juclgc in a matter involving criminal jurisdiction, even though it is a decision under Article 226 of the Constitution of Incliir. Referring to Ram Kishan Fauji (supra), learned Senior Counsel submits that Supreme Court has emphatically held that if the proceeding, nature

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and relief sought for pertain to anything connected with criminal jurisdiction, an intra-court appeal would not lie.

2l.I.He submits that a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Giangaram Kandaram v. Sunder Chikha Amine had held that issuing a writ of mandamus or certiorari by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India pertaining to a criminal complaint or proceeding cannot be said to be an order passed in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, Andhra Pradesh High Court held that an appeal would lie under C1ause 15 of the Letters Patent from the order of the learned Single Judge quashing investigation in a criminal case under Article 226 of t!;re Constitution of India. However, Supreme Court noted that a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt v. State of cujaratro had held that a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution arising from an order passed or made by a court in exercise or purported exercise of power under the Code of Criminal Procedure would still be a "criminal proceeding" within the

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meaning of Clause 15 of tl-rc Letters Patent. A proceeding seeking to avoicl the conseqr-rences of a criminal proceeding initiated undr:r the Code of Criminal Procedure would continue to rcmain a "criminal proceeding" covered by the bracketed poltron of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Thereafter, Divisior-r Bcrrch of Gujarat High Court ruled that as Clausr: 15 of the Lctters Patent expressly bars an appeal against arl order passed by a learned Single Judge of the H igh Court in cxc'rcisc of criminal jurisdiction, Letters Patent appeal against such an order would not be maintainable

2l .2. Mr. D.V.Sithzrram MLrr-thy, iearned Senior Counsel thereafter referred to the Fr-rll Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in C.S.Agarwal v. Staterl. He submits that Full Bench of the l)elhi High Cotrrt had held that proceedings under Articl e 226 of tl.re (lonstitution of India would be treated as original civil proi'eeding only when it concerns civil rights. I[ it conccrns a criminal matter, then such proceedings s'c,uld be origin,rl criminal proceedings. Letters Patent appeal q,ould lic ri lrcn the learned Single Judge

" 201 I sCC onl.inc t)rl I136

decides the writ petition 1n proceedings concerning civil rights. On the other hand, if these proceedings are concerned with rights in criminal law domain, then it can be stated that the learned Single Judge was exercising his criminal jurisdiction while one deals with such a petition being filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Court decision in Ram Kishan Fauji (supra) contended that the conception of "criminal jurisdiction" as used in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not to be construed in the narrol{r sensc It encompasses in its garnut the inception and the consequence. What is relevant is the field in respect of u,hich the jurisdiction is exercised. Supreme Court has held that Gujarat and Delhi High Court had correctly laid down the law; the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court did not lay down the corrcct lau,. On the basis of the decision of the Supreme Cotrrt in Ram l(ishan Fauji (supra), he submits that the r.l,rit appeal is not maintainable and therefore should be dismissed . 2I.3. Learned Senior Counsel on the basis of the Supreme

21.4. Insofar :he contention of Mr. Candra Mohan Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the de facto complainant 1S concerned, Ivir. D.V.Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for respondent Nos. L, 2 and 3 submits that the de facfo complainant was arrayed as respondent No.8 in writ petition No.40733 of 2022. He had himself appeared before the Court and had filed counter affidavit, which was considered by the learned Single Judge. When the de J ctcto complainant had himself appeared and participated in the ri'rit proceedings, he cannot turn around and nor,r, contend that notice wirs not issued or served upon him. Such a contcntion has to be recorded only to be rejected.

21.5. Adverting to page 63 of the paper book, he submits that the de facto complainant was represented by Mr. A.Prabhakar Rao, learned Senior Counsel who had argucd the mzitter and his submissions were recorded by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 17 of the judgment.

21.6. On merit, he submits that learned Single Judge has pointccl out several contradictions in the F.l.R. ir.s r.vell as in

the application seeking remand filed before the magistrate. Adverting to G.O.Ms.No.63 dated 09.11.2022 (pg. 438 of the paper book), he submits that while requesting the government to constitute a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to carn, out proper investigation in crime No.455 of 2022, Dircctor General of Police had opined that the case is scnsitive, high profile and sensational in nature and as it invol',.es investigation 1n multiple dimensions, r.r,hich requires thorough scientific and evidence based investigation in an elaborate manner; it requires officers witl-r experience and requisite expertise with specific skill sets to carry out investigation. Pausing here for a moment, learned Senior Counsel submits that his clients, i.e., respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (writ petitioners) are ordinarl, persons. Under no circumstances, can they be termed as high profile. Director General of Police had at the very threshold taken the view that the case would involve high profile people. This only discloses the pre-determincd or pre conceived nature of investigation sought to be carried out b-r, the police and SIT. Such motivated investigation has rightl-r. bccn interdicted by the learned Single Jr-rdge.

Conciuding his submissions, learned Senior Counsel contends that u,rit appeals are liable to be dismissed both on the point ol maintainability as well as on merits

Mr. L.Ravichander, learned Senior Counsel has also appeared on beha-lf of the same set of respondents though in a different appea-l being W.A.No.42 of 2023

22.1.Assailing the submissions made on behall of the de .facto complainant that he u,as not put on notice, learned Senior Counsel has referred to page 8 of the paper book and submits therefrom that in u.rit petition No.40733 of 2022, the cause title clearly mentions that counsel for respondent No.8 (de facto cornplainant Mr. Pilot Rohit Reddy) was Mr. A.Prabhakar Rao, whose prescnce u,as duly noted. Adverting to paragraph 4O of the judgment of the learned Single Judge at page 103 of the paper book, Mr L.Ravichander, learned Senior Counsel submits that submissions of Mr. A. Prabhakar Rao, Ieerr-red Senior Counsel appearing for the de facto complilinar-rt u'ere duly recorded and considered b1, the learned Single Judge. ". Therefore, non-issuance of formal notice to tlne d-e facto complainant had caused no prejudice to him and this cannot be put up as a ground of appeal to the well reasoned findings ofthe learned Single Judge.

22.2.Adverting to pa.ragraph 21 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge at page 73 of the paper book, learned Senior Counsel submits that it was specifically pleaded in paragraph 5 of the writ affidavit in W.P.No.43 l44 of 2022 and again in paragraphs 6, 7 and B of the writ affidavit in W.P.No.43339 of 2022 that the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Rajendranagar had handed over the investigation material in pen drives to the Hon'ble Chief Minister of the Telangana, who inturn had sent those materials in the form of CDs to various constitutional functionaries of the counfir. He submits that the State could not deny such assertion of the writ petitioners. He has also referred to G.O.Ms.No.63 dated 09.7I.2022 constituting the SIT and submits therefrom that before investigation could progress, Director General of Police had already formed an opinion that high profile people are involved in this case. Therelore

the investigalion uras alread-y motivated. Such motivated investigation rvould be an abuse of the criminal process.

22.3. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the completely tainted. No fair ir.rvestigation is possible. Placing reliance on an English decision in R. v. Sussex Justicesr2, he submits that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. This has been relied ul)on b-' thc Supreme Court in Justice P.D.Dinakaran v. Judges Inquiry Committee13. investigation initiated bv tl-re police or by the SIT is

22.4. Refuting the submissions of Mr. Dave that on one hand allegation of ntala lides q,ere made against the Hon'lole Chiel Minister bv the ."r,rit petitioners but on the other hand h(-' \ ras not arraycd AS a party to the writ proceedings, M r. L.Ravichalder, learned Senior Counsel for factually incorlect ir-r zis mLIt'h as the Hon'ble Chief Minister was in fact arr-a.ycd as a rc'spondent in the writ petitions, but the point isi that allegatrons made by respondent Nos. 1, respondent Nos. 1, 2 ar-td ll submits that while this is

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2 and 3 are based on legal malice. Placing reliance on the decision ol the Supreme Court in Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (decided on 06.09.20IO), he submits that the State is under an obligation to act fairly without any ill-will or malice - in fact or in law. Elaborating further, he submits that legal malice or malice in law means something done without lawful excuse. It is an act done wrongfully and wilfuily without reasonable or probable cause and not necessarily an act done from illfeeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal itl-will or spite on the part of the State. It is an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. It means exercise of statutory power for purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended. It means a conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another.

22.5.lnsofar appellate jurisdiction is concerned, he submits that this Court is exercising jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. If two views are reasonably

possible, then the view taken by the learned Single Judge should not be disturbed or substituted by a different view taken by the appellate bench. He submits that view taken by learned Single Judge is a reasonable and a plausible view and therefore, the same should not be disturbed. Further, insolar jurisdiction of the High Court under Clause I 5 of the Letters Patent is concerned, the same can be exercised by the Division Bench only if the judgment of the lcarned Single Judge is totally perverse. In this connection, he has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of thc Andhra Pradesh High Court in N.seshaiah v. South Central Railway (Writ Appeal No.2O7 of 2OL9, decided on 18.O9.2019).

22.6. Before concluding, he submits that appellants had filed il memo lrcfore the learned ACB Judge informing him that police int,:nded to add a few more persons as accused. ACB ,)udge had passed a detailed order refusing to accept such memo of the appeilants. In the said order, he had also qucstioned the very constitution of SIT. Assailing such order of the learned ACB Judge, State had filed a criminal >^

revision case before the learned Single Judge of this Court which has been dismissed. Therefore, de hors the judgment of the learned Single Judge, in view of the decision of this Court confirming the view taken by the learned ACB Judge, there is no way that SIT can function as an investigating agency.

Mr. C.Damodar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel has appeared for Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). BJP had filed u.rit petition No.39767 of 2022 challenging the biased and unfair investigation in F.I.R.No.455 of 2022 and had sought for transfer of investigation to CBI or alternativel_v, for constitution of SIT by the Court. However, learned Single Judge by the aforesaid judgment and order has dismissed the writ petition as not being maintainable. He submits that it is indeed very surprising that against such dismissal order, State has filed appeal being writ appcal No.44 of 2022. Tbis writ appeal has got no merit at a1l and should be dismissed. He submits that several sweeping and unsubstaltiated allegations have been made against his client and therefore, it is his duty to put the record

straight- He submits that TRS party itself has scant regard for democracy. In the past, it had resorted to unethical practices to lure MLAs from other political parties. One such M.L.A. who has defected from the Congress party to the TRS party is tl-:,e de facto cornplainant himself. His disqualification application under the alti-defection law is still pending. It, therefore, does not lie in his mouth to speak about democracy or threat to democrac.y.

Mr. Uday Holla, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. Bhusarapu Srinivas, Iearned counsel for respondent No.1 in writ appeal No.43 of 2023 submits that there is complete misuse of State machinery by thc Telangana Government. To serve a notice under Section 4 iA of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) upon his client, Assistant Commissioner of Police in the SIT s'ent u,ith a huge posse of policemen to his residence. It is a clear case of intimidation. Being a practising advocate. he is in no way connectecl with the controversv. Unnecessarily, he is sought to be dragged into the case. There is absolute lack of objectivit5z by the State police. Therefore, he had

challenged the notice issued under Section 41A of CrPC by filing W.P.No.42228 of 2022. However, learned Single Judge in pa-ragraph 44.3 of the judgment and order held that in view of the orders passed in the other writ petitions quashing SIT and transferring investigation to CBI, no orders were required to be passed in W.P.No.42228 of 2022, which was accordingly closed.

We have also heard Mr. S.D.Sanlay Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel representing respondent No. 1 in writ appea-l No.36 of 2023 which has arisen out of W.P.No.43339 of 2022. While reiterating the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, he has also added that learned Single Judge has considered all aspects of the matter in a thorough and dispassionate manner. Thereafter, learned Single Judge had come to a definite conclusion that under the police or under the SIT, there can be no fair investigation. Rights of the accused would be severely jeopardised under such rnvestigation Therefore, learned Single Judge has right11, quashed constitution of SIT and directed handing ovcr of

investigation to CBI. CBI is an independent investigating agency constituted under the Dethi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Investigation by CBI will reveal the truth or otherwise of the allegations made by tlrre de facto cornplairr ant. De fac:to complainant had made an accusation; if truth is on his side, he need not worry as to which agency investigates the truth of his accusation. He, therefore, submits that all the writ appeals should be dismissed.

In his reply subrnissions, Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has referred to Clause 15 of tlrr: Letters P:rtent and thereafter submits that judgment and order of the learned Single Judge calnot be said to have been rendered in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. A<lvert.ing to tl-re pleadings and relief sought for by the writ petitior-rcrs in tl-re u'rit petition, he submits that those are purely civil and public law remedy. There was no exercise of criminai jurisdiction b1, the learned Single Judge. Relief songht for bv the srrit petitioners was not to quash F.l.R. or thc ini,estigation. What they had

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complained before the learned Single Judge was violation of their statutory and fundamental rights' The writ petitions were clearly filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a maldamus for transfer of investigation which prayer was purely constitutiona,l and civil in nature. Writ petitioners did not cha-llenge the F.I.R nor the investigation. Therefore, it cannot be said that learned Single Judge had exercised criminal jurisdiction. Learned Senior Counsel has placed relialce on the decision of Praga Tools Corporation v. C.A.Imanualr4 and also on the decision in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabairs to contend that the writ appeal is clearly maintair-rable.

26.1 . Learned Senior Counsel has made elaborate submissions on merit as u,ell. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Romila Thapar (supra), he submits that though the accused has a right to fair and impartial investigation besides freedom from unlawful arrest, the accused cannot scek that investigation should be carried out by a particular ergency.

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26.2. Reverting back to the appeal papers, he submits that from page 305 of the paper book it is seen that in the remand appl,cation of the investigating officer, CD was submitted berbre the remand magistrate. He submits that from the rcnrand application dated 27.10.2022, second remard applir:ation dated 29.1O.2022 and the proceedings before thc lea'l'ned Single Judge on 03.11.2022, it would be evident thal al1 the materials were in public domain. Nothing renriLined confidcntial. He submits that BJP rushed to the court by filing writ petition No.39767 of 2022 immediatclv o,-r the very next day of lodging of F.l.R. If the BJP contencls that it has got nothing to do with the accused persons, then there is no reason for it to become so zrpprehensivc. He submrts that the present is clearly a trap procecding in u,hich the accused persons had participated voluntarily. Thus, the offence stood con-rmitted. Ir-r this context, the press meet by the Hon'ble Chiel Mir.rister is really immateria-l. Adverting to the clecision in state of Haryana v. Bhajan L1ro, he submits that ttre allegations clearly make out commission of cognizable r" rgel Supp ( t) SCC j.j

offence. Police has a statutory duty to investigate' Court should not interfere in the investigation. In that case, Supreme Court clarilied that personal animosity of the complainant would by itself not be a ground to discard the compiaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. Learned Senior Counsel has referred to the decision in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Uaion of IndiatT and submits that independence of the judiciary as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution is to secure the rule of lalr, essential for preservation of the democratic system. He submits that there is no room for any compromise with the basic scheme of our constitution. No person is above the larv and cautioned that the courts should be unbending before power, economic or political.

26.3. Proceeding further, learned Senior Counsel has pointed out that iearned Single Judge had merely referred to certain dccisior-rs, such as, Babubhai v. State of cujaratl8.

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Mohan Lal v. State of Gujaratle and Pooja Pal v. Union of Indiazo without any proper analysis as to the applicability of the said decisions in the facts of the present case and thereafter reached the impugned conclusions u'hich cannot be justified in law as well as on facts.

26.4. Mr. Dav,:, learned Senior Counsel has submitted a set of fresh material papers, u,herefrom he submits that certain highly objectionable statements have been made by one of the persons to whom notice under Sectiorr 4 1A of CrPC was issued. He has virtually threatened the investigation team as well as the de facto complair-rant that they rvould have to face the consequences of dragging his name into the case. Such statements made u,hen the hearing of the appeals is in progress virtuall-' amounts to committing criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

26.5. Referring to a decision of the Supreme Court in state ... of West Bengal Sampat tr.12t, Mr. Dave submits that

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Supreme Court had placed or rather reposed full confidence in the State police holding that there was no necessity of the CBI being called in as was done by the High Court. That was a case where Calcutta High Court had acted upon letters which alleged that two young boys by names, Tirttrankar Das Sharma and Sanjib Chatterjee living in Barrackpore a.rea, were found missing. Subsequently, dead bodies of the two boys were found from the railway track. Those were disposed of by the local police without taking any steps for identification. The letters alleged that parents of the two boys had approached various authorities including the Chief Minister, but no importance was given. It was alleged that Chief Minister had made a statement even before completion of investigation that it was a case of suicide. The letters were treated as writ petition, whereafter a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court directed CBI to cause an enquiry and to report back to the Court. Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court clarified that direction by the learned Single Judge was to the Deputy Inspector General of CBI to act as specia-l officer for the purpose of carrying

out the investigation. Whcn the Deputy Inspector General expressed his unu,illingness to carry out the investigation, the Division Bench opined t hat some other special ofhcer would have to be appointccl. Whereafter the matter came to the Supreme Court. In thc facts of that case, Supreme Court found that there \ras no adequate material on record for the learned Single Judge to appoint a special officer. Police had aLready comnrcnced investigation. Supreme Court held that investigation is a matter for the police under the scheme of CrPC. lnterference by the High Court into police in',-estigation \'.rs r-rot approved. Therefore, Supreme Courl set asidc the order of the High Court appointing special officer rcposing considerable faith in the State police. Supreme Courl l-rad observed that the police authorities would take the investigation as a challenge and justify their stand that the, \'ere competent to investigate arrd that there ,uvas no neccssitv of the CBI being called in. Mr. Dave poir-rts out thiet cven in this case, the Chief Minister had merde a st ilte ment on the floor of the Assembly even u,hen the int,estigations r.l,ere ongoing, that "*'-' the incident appeared to be a case of suicide and not

murder. Even in such a case, Supreme Court did not approve taking over of investigation from the State police. Besides, as held by the Supreme Court in Arnab Goswami v. Union of India22, no transfer of investigation can be ordered against the local police. merely because a party has levelled some allegations

26.6. Insofar the present case is concerned, Mr. Dave submits that there are senior officers in the SIT. No allegations have been made against them. In the circumstances, no case was made out for handing over of investigation to CBI. Learncd Singlc Judge had fallen into serious error in directing so. State police should not have been divested of its legitimate power to investigate the cognizable offence. Learned Single Judge failed to exercise his discretion based on sound judicial principles.

26.7. Mr. Dave has also place d before the Court a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Shiv Shankar Sharma23. He submits that allegations made in that CASE against the Chief Minister \/ere very vague and

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" 2022SCC OnLine SC l54l

generalised. Ii-rose were not at all substantiated by anything r,r,orth), to be ca-lled an evidence. Bald allegations of corruption and siphoning of money by shell companies were madc u'Lthout substantiating the allegations in any marner u,hatsoever. The shell companies were not even made parties :o the u,rit petition. In the facts of that case, Supreme Court held that it was not proper for the High Court to cnt,:rtain such public interest litigation (PIL) directing CBI investigation based on mere allegations. Accordinglv, c,rder of the High Court was set aside. He submits that l)resent case is also similar to the one in Shiv Shankar Sharma (sr-rpra)

26.a. A great rlcal of emphasis has been laid by Mr. Dave on non-issuinq of notice to the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Telangana thougl-r allegations of mala .,fides were made agair-rst him. Placing reliance on the decisions of the Suprcme Cour t ir-r State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyalz+ and Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India2s, he submits that mere charge of rnal,t.frdes, tl-rat too, in a vague manner is not

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adequate. Nothing has been stated in the writ affidavit as to which of the officers in SIT is ill-disposed towards the writ petitioners and in what manner. In the absence of any clear allegation and in the absence of impleading such a person so as to enable him to answer the charge against him, charges of mala fides cannot be sustained. Such aliegations ol ntala fides cannot be taken forward. That apart, he submits that as has been held by the Supreme court in sheonandan paswan v. state of Bihar26, a criminal

prosecution, if otherwise justiliable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta.

26.9. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh2T, he submits that registration of F.I.R. is mandatory under Section 154 of CrPC if the information discloses commission of cognizable offence. No preliminary enquiry is necessany or permissible in such a situation. If F.I.R. is not registered, action is to be taken against erring police oflicers. Scope of

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preliminary enquiry is not to verify the necessity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain rn,hether the information reveals commission of any cognizable offence.

26.10. Alter referring to the pleadings in the writ affidavit and the counter affidavit and also reiterating his eariier submissions based on the Supreme Court decision in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) as to the duty ol the court to uphold the ruie of Iaw, he submits that fir-rdings and conclusions of the learned Single Judge arc a bundle of contradictions. Those are required to be set aside.

1 I. Explaining the rationale for filing a se parate writ appeal against the decision of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by BJP as being not maintainable, Mr. Dave submits that earlier BJP had filed writ appeal against the decision of the learned Single Judge withdrawing the order for deferment of investigation. Division Bench had held that SIT constituted l;y rhe State should investigate the crime, but SIT would report to the learned Single Judge and not to arry other authority. This

decision was accepted by BJP in as much as they did not file SLP before the Supreme Court. SLP was liied by respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 before the Supreme Court. Therefore, the order of the Division Bench qua BJP has attained frnality. Since BJP had sought for investigation by SIT and that having been granted by the Division Bench, writ petition filed by BJP should have been disposed of with suitable observations and directions, instead learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition as being not maintainable. This distinction, he submits, is subtle but significant. It is for tlds reason that State has liled appeai even against dismissal of the writ petition filed by BJp.

Mr. Gandra Mohan Rao, learned counsel for |ne de facto complainant i.e., respondent No.6 has referred to Rules 8 and 1O of the High Court Writ Rules and submits that notice to the respondent is mandatory. He has referred to ground Nos. 19 and.20 in writ appeal No.42 of 2023 in this regard. He has also placed reliarce on a Calcutta High Court decision in DGp v. Gopal Kumar Agarwal2s and submits that learned Single Judge did not :8 2o2o SCC onLine Cal 755 exercise any criminarl

jurisdiction. Thus the u.rit appeals are maintainable. In any view of the matter, transfer of investigation to alother agency, in this case to CBI, is not to be done in a routine arrd mechanical manner. It is only in rarest of the rare case that there should be transfer of investigation. Therefore, linding fault r.r,ith the approach of the learned Single Judge, he submits that the same needs to be corrected in appeal.

27.l.In similar circumstances, in Gopal Kumar Agarwal (supra), Ca-lcutta High Court has held that writ appeals are maintainable and not barrcd by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Calcutta High Court had examined the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji (supra) but noticed that order of the learned Single Judge had neither resulted in initiation of criminal proceedings nor quashing of criminal proceedings. Present appeals stand on similar footing as in Gopal Kumar Agarwal (supra).

Sutrmissions made br' learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the Court. / Mr. Dushyant Dave, lean-red Senior Counsei for the \ appellants in writ appeal No.37 of 2O23 has filed written

submissions aJter conclusion of the arguments' Similarly, Mr. V.Ram Mohan Reddy, learned counsel representing respondent No. 1 in writ appeal No.43 of 2023 has submitted written arguments. The written submissions and

arguments have been duly considered.

Analysis:

At the outset, we may first deal with the preliminary objection raised by Mr. D.V.Sitharam Murthy, learned Senior Counsel representing respondent Nos. 1,2 and 3 to the effect that the writ appeals ltled being intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are not maintainable in as much as substance of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge out of which the appeals arise pertain to criminal jurisdiction. It is contended that subject matter of the writ petitions and the direction of the learned Single Judge relate to criminal jurisdiction. Against such an order of the learned Single Judge, no intra-court appeal would Iie. This is the preliminarv objection raised by respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3.
Letters Patent for the High Court of Judicature for the Presidency of Madras dated 28.12.1865 is applicable to the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. Clause 15 of the aforesaid Letters Patent deals with appeal from the courts of original jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction. Clause 15 being relevant, the same is extracted as under:
Appeal from the Courts $of$ Original Jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction:- And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Madras from the judgment not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act made (on or before the 1st day of February 1929) in the exercise of appellate

jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where Lhe Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a ht one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council as hereinafter provided.

1. From a perusal of the above, what Clause 15 provides for is that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one judge of the said High Court or one judge of any Division Court. However, no such appeal shall lie if the judgment IS passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of decree or order impugned in the exerclse of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to superintendence of the said High Court; no appeal shall lie against arr order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction; no such appeal shall lie against an order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintende nce under the provisions of the Government of lndia Act, 1935; or if an order is made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of one Judge of tl.e said High Court.

31. In Umaji Keshao Meshram (supra), the question u,hich fell for detcrmination of the Supreme Court was whether al appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court to a Division Bench of trvo judges of that High CorLrt from the judgment of the Single Judge oi that High Court in a petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Supreme Court noted that Letters Patent of the Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courls are mu tatis mutandis in the same terms u,ith minor rrariations mostly as a result of amendments subsequently made. Supreme Court ana-lysed Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and thereafter held as foliows:-

When analysed and broken up into its competent parts clause 15 in its finally amendcd and operative form reads as follows:

An appeal shall lie to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay-

(1) from a judgment

(2) of one Judge of the High Court

(3) pursuant to Section 108 of the Govcrnment of India Act of 19 15

(4) not be ing-

(a) a judgment passed in the exercisc of appcllate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate

jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court,

(b) an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction,

(c) a. sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act of 19 15, or

(d] a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of criminal ju risdiction.

31.1.In that case, having regard to the question before the Supreme Court the deliberation was confined to the distinction between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and maintainability of an intra-court appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It was in that context, Supreme Court observed that under Article 226, High Courts have power to issue directions, orders and writs to any person or authority including any government but under Article 227, every High Court has power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The power to issue writs is not the sarne as the power of superintendence. By no stretch of

imagination, can a rvrit in the nature of habeas corpus or mandamus or quo u)arranto or prohibition or certiorari be equated nith the power of superintendence. These are writs which are dirccted against persons, authorities and the State. On th,: oth er hand , the power of superintendence conferred upon every High Court by Article 227 is the supervisorv jurisdiction intended to ensure that subordinate ('ourts ald tribunals act within the limits of their authoritv and according to law. The two processes are not the szrmt. It is u,cll settled that a proceeding under Article 226 ol the Const i tution of India is an original proceeding arrd u,hen it r:oncerns civil rights, it is an original civil procceding. Therefore, Supreme Court held that where a petition is liled under Article 226 of the Constitution ,rf India and is according to the rules of a particular High Court heard by a learned Single Judge, an intra-court appeal rvill lie from that judgment if such a right of apperrl 1S provicle cl in the Charter of that High Court, n'hcther such Chartr'r be Letters Patent or a statute. Clause 15 of the Letters prrtent of the Bombay High Court = grves in such a case a right of intra-court appeal and

therefore, the decision of a learned Single Judge of that High Court given in a petition under Article 226 of lhe Constitution of India would be appealable to a Division Bench of that High Court. However, a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution is not an original proceeding. After due analysis, Supreme Court concluded that an intra-court appeal does not lie against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court given in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by reason of such appeal being expressly barred by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Therefore, such an intra-court appeal would not be maintainable.

Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to briefly dilate on the cor-itours of a civil proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the same is necessarl/ to be understood to make a contra-distinction to r.l,hat is termed as a criminal proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution
In S.A.L.Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandaszs, Bombay High Court had decided a challenge made to an order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 32 A of the Irrdian Income Tax Act, 1922. Bolrrbay High Court quashed the aforesaid order. Against that, revenue preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court on certificate granted by the' High Court. At the appellate stage, assessee raised an objection that the appeal was not maintainable because the High Court had no power to certify a proposed appeal againsl an order in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in as much as the proceeding before the High Court was not a "civil proceedings" u,ithin the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution of India After advertinll to Article 133 of the Constitution, which deals 'u,ith ap1>ellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to civil matters, Supreme Court delved into the meaning of the expressiorr "civil proceeding" as appearing in the aforesaid article. [t u,as in that corrtext, Supreme Court opined that there is no ground for restricting the expression .,civil proceeding,, onl,v

AIR t96-s sc tti |li

to those proceedings which arise out of civil suits or proceedings which are tried as civil suits nor is there any rational basis for excluding from its purview proceedings instituted and tried in the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, where the aggrieved party seeks relief against infringement of civil rights by authorities purporting to act in exercise of powers conferred on them by revenue statutes. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by the assessee \vas rejected

A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in sanleev Rajendrabhai Bhatt (supra) examined maintainabilifl, of Letters Patent appeals before it. Two questions \ryere framed. Firstly, whether an order passed by the learned Single Judge can be said to have been made in the exercise ol extraordinar5r powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or in the exercise of supe rvisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India? Second question was whether the order passed by the lear-ned Single Judge can be said to have been passed in

the exercise of criminal jurisdiction within the meaaing of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

34.1. A brief recital of the relevant facts is necessary. Sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt was serving as a District Superintendent of Police at Palanpur at the relevant time. One Sumersingh Rajpurohit was initially arrested on 03.05.1996 under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Investigation was carried out thereafter. However, in the identification parade, Sumersingh Rajpurohit could not be identified by the witnesses. Therefore, police submitted a report under Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the Special Court at Palanpur for release of Sumersingh Rqjpurohit, who was released on bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, Palanpur, whereaJter he was finally discharged. Sumersingh Rajpurohit filed a complaint before the competent Chief Judicial Magistrate against Sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt in r.r,hich a direction was issued for registration of offence a:rd for investigation by an officer not below the rank of Director General of police. When Saajeev

Rajendrabhai Bhatt filed a revision application before the Additional Sessions Judge, an order was passed maintaining the direction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate except that portion which stated that investigation be carried out by an officer not below the rank of Director General of Police. It was thereafter that F.l.R. was registered under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) read with certain sections of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Since Sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt apprehended arrest, he approached the Gujarat High Court by liling Special Criminal Application seeking a writ of mandamus or prohibition restraining the investigating officer from carrying on any further investigation, besides High Court was called upon to quash and set aside the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate as well as the subsequent F.l.R. Though initially, a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court had issued a direction not to arrest the petitioner Sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt, subsequently the Special Criminal Application was dismissed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as it was stated that the cause of

action arose in the State of Rajasthal. It was from this order that L(tters Patent appeal was preferred before the Division Benr:h. Alter adverting to various legal provisions and judicral pronouncetncnts, the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that it was not necessary to express fina1 opinion on the question as to whether the petition filed lrelore the lcarned Single Judge can be said to be under Article 226 or Ar-tic1e 227 of the Constitution of India, as the Division Bench was of the opinion that even on other grounds, the Lctters Patent appeal was not maintainable. It u,as thereafter that the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court proceeded to deal with the second question as t,r q,hether tht' order passed by the learned Single Judge could be sairl to be an order passed in the exercise of "cr iminal jurisdiction" as referred to in Clause 15 of the Lettr:rs Patent. Division Bench distinguished the earlier Full Br:nch decision of the Gujarat High Court in Pate1 Kashiram Lavjibhai v. Narottamdas Bechardas3o. It was noted that reference was nrade to the Full Bench on the \ question as to u,hether an rrppeal against the decision of a

r,,(1978) 19GLR t047 1Fa)

learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was barred under Clause 15 of the ktters Patent because the decision of the learned Single Judge was rendered in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or it was otherwise barred? It was in that context, the Full Bench had alswered the reference by holding that the appeal would lie under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a decision of a learned Single Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In that context, it was opined that decision of the learned Single Judge could not be said to be given in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. After analysing the Full Bench decision, the Division Bench observed that the FuII Bench did not hold that a Letters Patent appeal would be maintainable even if an order was passed by a learned Single Judge in exercise of "criminal jurisdiction". Decision of the Full Bench u,as silent as regards maintainability of an appeal against the order passed by a learned Single Judge in exercise of "criminal jurisdiction". Distinguishing between civil proceedings and criminal proceedings in the

li0

context of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that a criminal proceeding is ordinarily or-ie in which, if carried out to its such as death, imprisonment, fine or forfeiture of the property. Tht refore, Division Bench opined that the said proceedings dealt with by it were criminal proceedings in as much as il the proceedings were carried out to its conclusion those might result in imprisonment, fine etc. It rvas thereafter held as follows: conclusion, it may result in the imposition of sentences

From the totality of facts and circumstalces, u,e havc no hcsitation in holding that the learned single Judge has passed an order in exercise of crimina-l jurisdiction. At the cost of repetition, we reiterate what u,e have alrcady stated earlier ttrat the proceedings wcrc of :r criminal nature. Whether a criminal Court takes co1;nizance of an offence or sends a complaint for invcstigation under Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not make diflerence so far as tl-re nature of proceedings is concerned. Even if cognizance is not taken, that fact would not take out the case from the purview of criminal .1 urisdiction.

In our judgment, a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution arising from al order passed or rnade I;-y.r Court in exercise or purported exercise of

power under the Code of Criminal Procedure is still a 'criminal proceeding' within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Irtters Patent. A proceeding seeking to avoid the consequences of a criminal proceeding initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure will continue to remain triminal proceeding' covered by tJle bracketed portion of Clause 15 of the l€tters Patent.

As Clause 15 of the Letters Patent expressly bars an appeal against the order passed by a single Judge of the High Court in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. l-PAs are not maintainable and deserve to be dismissed only on that ground. We accordingly hold that the ktters Patent Appeals a-re not maintainable at law and they are liable to be dismissed.

34.2. Thus, the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that order of the learned Single Judge was passed in exercisc ol criminal jurisdiction. A proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising from an order passed or made by a Court in exercise or purported exercise of power under the CrPC would still be a "criminal proceeding" u,ithin the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. As Clause 15 of the l,etters Patent expressly bars an appe zrl against an order passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of criminal jurisdiction, Letters Patent appeals against such an order of a lcarned

Single Judge would not be maintainable ald those are liable to be drsmissed.

A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gangaram Kandaram (supra) u,as considering a question as to r.l,hether an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court would lie against an order of a learned Single Judge interfering q,ith an ongoing investigation under CrPC. In other words, the question u,as whether a proceeding for quashing of investigation in a criminal case under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a civil proceeding and judgment delivered therein u,ould be a judgment in a civil proceeding in exercise of original jurisdiction o1' the High Court lor the purposes of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Full Bench ol the Andhra Pradesh High Court held as follor'r,s:

With regald to the second question as to whether the appeal under clause 15 of Letters Patent of the Court lies against the judgment in such a case. In other words, whether thc proceedings for quashing of the investigation in a criminal case under Article 226 of the Constitution is a civil procceding and the judgment as above is a judgment in a civil proceeding in exercise of tJ-e original jurisdicl_ion of the Court for

the purpose of appeal under clause 15 of lrtters Patent.

As per Clause 15 of l,etters Patent, no appeal shall lie against the judgment of one Judge of the said High Cou* or one Judge of any Division Bench passed in exercise of appellate jurisdicLion in respect of decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in exercise of power of superintendence of Section 107 of Govcrnment of India Act or in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. An appeal shall lie to the Division Bench under Clause 15 of Letters Patent from the judgment of onc Judge of the High Court or one Judge of any Division Bench. The appeal from Judgrnents of Singlc .Judges of the High Court shall lie to the Division Bench except the judgznents prohibited by Clause 15. The learned Single Judge while exercising tlle extra-ordinarlr jurisdiction under Article 226 quashed the criminal proceedings. In our view, the exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution by issuing a writ in quashing the FIR is not in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. No doubt against the order under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code or against the proceedings under Contempt of Court, no appeal will lie under Clause 15 of Letters of Patent, but against the judgments quashing the FIR in exercisc of the original jurisdiction of the Court under Articlc 226, Writ Appeal lies under Clause i5 of Letters Patcnt. Issuing a writ of mandamus or certiorari by the High

Court rrnder Articlc 226 pertaining to a criminal complaint or procecding cannot be said to be an order passed in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, we hold that an appeal lics under Clause 15 of l,etters Patent.

The learned cor.rnsel for the appellant relied upon a judgment o1' Madras High Court in Re. S. Gouindasu.tamg lvathan (AIR 1955 Madras 121). That case a.rose out of contcmpt proceedings in respect of a criminal scssions junscliction of the High Court but not against an ordr:r passed under Art- 226 of Constitution of India. and therefore, the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case.
We accordingll, :r-nswer the second question that an appeal under c:lause l5 of Letters Patent of the Court lies against thc -tu(lgment in such a case.
1 . After aniJysing Clause I 5 of the Letters Patent, the Full Bench obser,ed that r:xercise of power under Article 226 of the CorLstitutir.rn of India by issuing a writ quashing F.I. R. was not in exercise ol criminal jurisdiction. Though against an order under Section 482 CrPC or against proceedings ulrder the Contcmpt of Courts Act, 1971, no appeal u,ould lic undcr Cllarrst' 15 of the Letters Patent but against a judqment quaslring F_1.R. in exercise of the \ original jurisdi<:tion of the Hrgh court under Article 226 0f

the Constitution of India, writ appeal would lie under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Issuing a writ of mandamus or certiorari by the High Court under Article 226 pertaining to a criminal complaint or proceeding cannot be said to be an order passed in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that an appeal would lie against such an order of the learned Single Judge under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

This question was also considered by a Full Bench of 36. the Delhi High Court in C.S.Agarwal (supra). C.S.Agarwal had filed the writ petition before the Delhi High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of CrPC for quashing of FIR lodged against him under various sections of IPC. However, the writ petition was dismissed. Against that order, he filed a Letters Patent appeal before the Division Bench. Respondents took a preliminary objection as to maintainability of the Letters Patent appeal contending that judgment of the learned Single Judge was rendered in exercise of criminal

$\mathcal{O}$

jurisdiction. Therefore, Letters Patent appeal against such a judgment would not be maintainable. Division Bench after hearing the matter, referred the same to the Full Bench on the following question:

Whether the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing FIR would amount to invoking 'original jurisdiction' or these proceedings are to be treated as invoking 'criminal jurisdiction'?

36.1. Full Bench heard the submissions made and considered Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Lahore which is applicable to the High Court of Delhi. We may mention at this stage that Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court as made applicable to the Delhi High Court is pari materia to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Madras High Court made applicable to the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. After adverting to Clause 10 of the aforesaid Letters Patent, Full Bench noted as follows:

This clause clearly prohibits maintainability of an intra-court appeal if the impugned judgment is passed in exercise of:

$\sim$

revisional jurisdiction
the power of superintendence
criminal jurisdiction

36.2.1n the above backdrop, Full Bench examined the question as to whether the judgment passed by the leamed Single Judge in the writ petition filed by C.S.Agarwal u'as in exercise of "criminal jurisdiction". Thereafter, Full Bench held as follows:

No doubt, as per the aforesaid pronouncements explaining the nature of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High court in such proceedings exercises original jurisdiction. At the same time, it is also clarifred that the said jurisdiction is not to be confused with the "original civil jurisdiction" of the High Court. Further, proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution would be treated as original civil proceedings only when it concerns civil rights. A fortiori, if it concerns a crirninal matter, tJ:en such proceedings would be original criminal proceedings. L€tters Patent would lie when the Singie Judge decides the writ petition in proceedings concerning civil rights. On the other hand, if these proceedings are concerned with rights in criminal law domain, then it can be said that the Single Judge was exercising his "criminal jurisdiction" while dealing with such a petition hled under Article 226 of the Constitution.

For this reason, we cannot agree with the extreme position taken by the appellants that the exercise of

pov/ers under Art:cle 226 of the Constitution would never tantamount to exercising criminal jurisdiction, irrespective of the nature of proceedings. We, further, are of the opinion that if such a petition relates to criminal proceedings while dealing with this petition under Article 226 of t};.e Constitution, the Court would be exercising "criminal jurisdiction". ln this context, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.A.L. Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas [AIR 1965 SC 1818]. In that case, proceedings were initiated under the lncome Tax Act, 1922. At the conclusion of proceedings before the High Court under Art:cle 226, a certihcate for fitness was sought under Article 131(1)(c) read with Article 132(i) of the Constitution. The question before the Apex Court was as to whether the proceedings before the High Court under Article 226 are "civrl proceedings''. The Constitution Bench opined that whether tlie proceedings are civil or not depends upon the nature of the right violated and the appropriatc relief whrch may be claimed and not upon thc nature of the Tribunal which is invested with authority to grant relief. In the process, following pertinent observatjons were made which are appositc in our context:

A criminal proceeding on the other hand is ordinarily one in which lf carried to its conclusion it may result in the imposition of sentences such as death, imprisonment, finc or forfeiture of property.

The Court was, thus, categorical that cvcn in a petition trnder Article 226 of the Constitution when the High Court is exercising extraordinarlz jurisdiction.

the nature of proceedings, whether civil or criminal, would depend uPon the nature of right violated and the nature of relief sought in the said petition.

36.3. Full Bench of the Delhi High Court also considered the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gangaram Kandaram (supra) as well as the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt (supra). Agreeing u,ith the r.ieu, taken by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt (supra), Ful1 Bench of thc Delhi High Court expressed its inability to subscribe to the view taken by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, whereafter it was held as follows:

It would be necessary to clarify here that it cannot be said that in any of the cases under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court is excrcising 'criminal jurisdiction'. It would depend upon thc rights sought to be enforced and the nature of relief which the petitioner seeks in such proceedings. For example, if a writ petition seeking writ of habeas corpus is hled, while dealing with such a petition, the Court is not exercising criminal jurisdiction as no criminal proceedings are pending. In fact, ttre order of preventive detention is made without any trial under the criminal law. Likewise, when a person is convicted and sentenced after t]-e conclusion of criminal trial

and such ar order of conviction has attained firnality and hc files writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the orders of the Government refusing to grant parole while deaiing with such a petition, the Single Judge is not exercising criminal jurisdictron, as no criminal proceedings are pending.

36.4. Finally, Full Bench ol the Delhi High Court opined that learned Single Ju dge \ras exercising crimina-l jurisdiction \vhile dealing \rith the writ petition of C.S.Agaru,al filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the l-('tters Patent appea1 was held to be barred and not maintirirrable; Lhe same was accordingly dismissed.

A11 the above threc dccisions i.e., Division Bench decision of th': Gujarat I lirlh Court in Sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt (supra), Full Benclr rlccision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gangaram Kandaram (supra) and FulI Bench decision of tl'rr' Dell-ri High Court in c.S.Agarwal (supra) were examined by the Suprt:nre Court in Ram Kishan Fauji (supra).
In Ram Kishan Fauji (supra), Chief Secretary to the Government of Haryana had made a reference to the

Lokayukta of Haryana under Section 8(1) of the Haryana Lokayukta Act, 2OO2 to enquire into certain allegations. Lokayukta, Haryana after issuing public notice and after carrying out enquiry, recommended registration of FIR for offences punishable under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19BB and for investigation by a senior competent officer of impeccable integrity. It was at this stage, Ram Kishan Fauji filed a writ petition before the High Court for quashing said order of Lokay'ukta. Learned Single Judge quashed the FIR on the grounds and reasons mentioned in the order (Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana ((2015 SCC On Line P&H 50581). This order came to be assailed before the Division Bench. Division Bench condoned the delay in filing the appeal and also stayed operation of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. Though Ram Kishan Fauji filed an application for vacation of the interim stay, the sarne was declined by the Division Bench. Subsequently, while making the interim stay absolute after admitting the Letters Patent appeal, the Division Bench directed the Director General of Police, Har5rana to constitute a fresh Special Investigation Team to

ensure absolute objectivity in the ongoing investigation comprising three senior IPS officers not belonging to the State of Haryana. Questioning the sustainability of the order passed by the Division Bench, Ram Kishan Fauji moved the Supreme Court.

38.1. Singular contention before the Supreme Court was that the Letters Patent appeal preferred before the Division Bench was not maintainable in as much as learned Single Judge had exercised criminal jurisdiction. Supreme Court considered various decisions and examined the meaning of the expression "civil proceeding" in contra-distinction to "criminal proceeding". It was held as follows:

The aforesaid authority makes a clear distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. As far as criminal proceeding is concerned, it clearly stipulates that a criminal proceeding is ordinarily one which, if carried to its conclusion, may result in imposition of $(i)$ sentence, and $(ii)$ it can take within its ambit the larger interest of the State, orders to prevent apprehended breach of peace and orders to bind down persons who are a danger to the maintenance of peace and order. The Court has ruled that the character of the proceeding does not depend upon the nature of the tribunal which is invested with the authority to grant relief but

upon the nature of the right violated and the appropriate relief which may be claimed.

38.2. Supreme Court held that to determine the maintalnability of the Letters Patent appeal from an order of the learned Single Judge, the determining factor is the real nature of the order passed by the learned Single Judge; nerther mentioning in the cause title of the application nor granting ancillary order by the learned Single Judge u,ould be relevant. In each case, the Division Bench must consider the substance of the judgement under appeal to ascertain whether tlre learned Single Judge has mainly or principally exercised jurisdiction under Articl e 226 of the Constitution of India or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Maintainability of a Letters Patent appeal would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petrtion; the nature and character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge; the type of directions issued regard being had to the jurisdictional perspective in the constitutional context.

38.3. Insofar exercising of criminal jurisdiction under Article 226 ol the Constitution of India is concerncd-.

Supreme Court was of the view that if the proceeding, nature and relief sought for pertains to anything connected with criminal jurisdiction, an intra-court appeal would not lie as the sarne is not provided under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Posing the question as to whether learned Single Judge had exercised civil jurisdiction or criminal jurisdiction, Supreme Court referred to the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in sanjeev Rajendrabhai Bhatt (supra) as weil as to the Irull Bench decision of th,: Delhi High Court in c.s.Agarwal (supra) and re-produced the following opinion of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court with approval:

... proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution would be treated as original civil proceedings only when it concerns civil rights. A fortiori, if it concerns a crimina.l matter, then such proceedings would be original criminal proceedings. Letters Patent would lie when the Singlc Judge decides the writ petition in proceedings concerning civil rights. On the other hand, if these proceedings are concerned with rights in criminal law domain, then it can be said that the Single .Iurlge u,as exercising his "crfuninal jurisdiction" while dcaling with su<:h a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution-

38.4. After thorough consideration of the above three decisions, Supreme Court held as follows:

As we find from the decisions of tlte aforesaid three High Courts, it is evident that there is no disagreement or conflict on the principle that if an appeal is barred under Clause lO or Clause 15 of the l,etters Patent, as the case may be, no appeal will lie. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, however, has held that when tJre power is exercised under Articlc 226 of the Constitution for quashing of a criminal proceeding, there is no exercise of criminal jurisdiction. It has distinguished the proceeding for quashing of the FIR under Section 482 CrPC and, in that context, has opined t1lat from such an order, no appeal would 1ie. On the contrary, the High Courts of Gujarat and Delhi, on the basis of the law laid dou,n by this Court in Ishwarlal Bh.ogutandas [CITv. Ishu.nrlal BhaguLando.s, (1966) I SCR 190 : AtR 1965 SC 18181, have laid emphasis on the seed of initiation of criminal proceeding, the consequence of a crimina-l proceeding and a,lso the nature of relief sought before the Single Judge under Article 226 of the Constitution. The conception of "criminal jurisdiction" as used in Clause 1O of the L€ttcrs Patent is not to be construed in the narrow sense- [l encompasses in its gamut the inception and tl.re consequence. It is the field in respect of which thc jurisdiction is exercised, is relevant. The contention that solely because a writ petition is filed to quash an invesLigation, it would have room for intra-court appeal and if a petition is ltled under inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, there would be

no space for an intra-court appeal, would create an anoma.lous, unacceptable and inconceivable situation. The pror.ision contained in the l,etters Patent does not allow or permit such an interpretation. When we are required to consider a bar or non permissibility, we have to appreciate the same in true letter and spirit. It confers jurisdiction as regards the subject of controversy or nature of proceeding and that subject is exercise of jurisdiction in criminal matters. It has nothing to do whethcr the order has been passed in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiclion under Article 226 of tl:.e Constitution or inhercnt jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.

In this regard, an example can be cited. In the State of Uttar Pradesh. Section 438 CrPC has been deleted by the Statc amenclmenl and the said deletion has been treated to l;e constitutionally valid by this Court in Kartar Singhv. State of Punjob lKartar Singhv. State of htnjob, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 8991. Howeve r, that has not curtailed tlre extraordinary power of the High Court to entertain a plea of anticipatory bail as has been held in lal Kamlendra Protap Singh [Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singhv. State of U.P., l2OO9l 4 SCC 437 : l2OO9l 2 SCC (Cri) 33Ol and Herna Mishra lHema Mishra v State of U.P.. (2O 14) 4 SCC 453 : (2014]; 2 SCC (Cril 363]. But that does not mean that an order passed by the Singlc.Judgc in exercise of Article 226 of the Constitution relating to criminal jurisdiction, can be made the subject-matter of intra-court appeal. It is not provided for ar-rd it u,ould be legally inappropr iate to think so.
In view of the aforesaid premised reasons, we hold that the High Courts of Gujarat and Delhi have correctly laid down the law altd the view expressed lGangaram Kandoram v. Sunder Chikha Amin, 2OOO SCC Online AP 119 : (2OOO| 2 An LT 4481 by the Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is incorrect.

38.5. Thus, Supreme Court is clear in its enunciation that conception of criminal jurisdiction as used in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is not to be construed in the narrow sense. It encompasses in its gamut the inception and the consequence. It is the field in respect of which the jurisdiction is exercised rvhich is relevant. After holding that High Courts of Gujarat and Delhi have correctly laid down the law and the vierv expressed by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is incorrect, Supreme Court in the facts of that case has held that learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India had passed an order in a criminal proceeding; what matters is the nature of the proceeding and that is the litmus test.

The afor-esaicl decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji (:;r-rpr:r) has been lollowed by the Punj ab and Haryana Higl Court in Jalaluddin v. State of Haryana3r. In that case, petitioner had sought for a direction to entrust investigation of pending F.l.R.No.90 dated 23.06.2017 registered before Faridabad Police Station to an independent irgenc\r like CBI. When learned Single Judge dismissed th,: u'rit pctition, petitioner filed intra-court appeal. Folloting the lau, laid down by the Supreme Court and Haryanir Higl-r Court observed that maintainability of an intra court appeal will depend on the Bench adjudicating th e lis as to how it understands and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge; therc cannot L,e any strait jacket formula. Thereafter, it has been held as lollovvs in Ram Kishan Fauji (supra). a Division Bench of the Punj ab

If the facts of tl're case in hand are examined in the light of praycr macle in the writ petition keeping in view thc cnunciation of law by Hon'ble the Supreme CourL in Rant Kishan Fouji's case (supra), in our opinion, rhe order passed by the learned Single Judge u,as in c'rcrcisc of criminal jurisdiction. Undisputedly,

'r l0l8 S('( oni_inc l)&H ullt

in the case in hand, FIR had already been registered and the trial is in progress. The appellant claimed that his son was murdered. Prayer was for transfer of investigation to an independent agency, like Central Bureau of Investigation. Investigation of a crime would fall within the criminal jurisdiction. Either the prayer madc by the appellant is allowed and aJter further investigation by an independent agency, fresh/ supplementary challan is presented or the trial continues in pursuance to the challan already prcsented, the result would be either acquittal or conviction of the accused, hence, the subject-matter is nothing else but criminal in nature.

The contention raised by learned counsel for thc appellant that writ petition has been frled alleging violation of Article 27 of th,e Constitution of India may not come to the rescue of the appellant to hold that intra-court appea-l is maintainable. Violation of fundamcntal rights is the ground raised for maintaining a petition for ql4lming relief from the court, but what is required to be seen is the substance of the case.
For the reasons mentioned above, in our view, the prcscnt intra-court appeal is not maintainable, hence, thc same is dismissed.

39.1. Thus, Pur-rjab and Haryana High Court has held that order passed by the learned Single Judge declining to transler investigation to CBI was passed in exercise of criminal jurisdictron. Though handing over of pending

investigation ro an independent agency would not arnount to discontinuance of investigation, however it u,ould result either in acquittal or conviction of the accused. Hence, the subject matter has been held to be criminal in nature. As to the content-ion advanced that the writ petition 'nas filed alleging violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of lndia, Division Bench of the Punj ab and Haryana High Court has he Id that violation of fundamental rights is a ground raised for maintaining a petition for claiming relief from the court case. In that .riew of the matter, Punj ab and Haryana High Court held that the intra-court appeal \ras not maintainable and accordingly dismissed the same. but rvhat is required to be seen is the substance of the

Similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in V.Kumar v. Superintendent of Police, CBI32. That u,as a case where learned Single Judge in a petition under Article 226 ol the Constitution of India had declined the pra/cr of the petitioner to transfer investigation to CBI Against such an order, intra-court appeal u.as filed Likeu,ise, a Division Bench of this Court in Kushi Chand '' N.i n NrJ/l N/6728/2021

r01

vadde v. S.Sreedhar Rao (W.A.No.257 of 2022, decided on 12.O4.20221 has also taken a similar view.

4I. However, there is one decision ll,hich has taken a contrary view and that is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Gopal Kumar Agarwal (supra). In that case, appeal was filed against the judgment and order of the learr-red Single Judge directing investigation of Raniganj P.S. Case No.372 of 2OI7 by the CBI in place of Crime Investigation Department (CIp), State of West Bengai. This order came to be challenged in an intra-court appeal. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court posed the question to itself as to u,hether or not learned Single Judge had passed the impugned order in exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Distinguishing the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji (supra), Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the facts of that case held that order of the learned Single Judge neither resulted in initiation of a criminal proceeding nor rn quashing of a criminal proceeding. Adverting to the averments in the writ petition, it was mentioned that the petitioner did not pray for

quashing of r:riminal proct:edings. Al1 that u,as sought for was transfer of investigatior-r to an independent agency. l,earned Single Judge u,as of the vieu, that the investigation was not being conducted in a proper manner. Accordingly, direction u,as issued to I'randover the investigation to CBI. Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court opined that this did not amount to exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the learned Singlr: .Iudgc. Learned Single Judge had exercised supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India rn directing change of the investigating ilgency. Crim jnal investigation u,as already in progress. Inve stigation .'as not initiated as a result of the order of the learned Singlc ,Judge.

We are afraid, Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had follor.l,ed the same line of reasoning as was adopted by the Full Bencl-r of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gangaram Kandaram (supra) u,hich has been specifically held by the Supreme Court as not laying down thecorrec@ki€+tffi \ Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji (supra) it needs to be

r03

mentioned that what is required to be examined is the nature of the proceedings; the substance of the case and the nature and character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge which is under appeal. Conception of criminal jurisdiction as used in Ciause 15 ol the Letters Patent is not to be construed in a narrow sense. What is relevant is the fieid in respect of u,hich the jurisdiction is exercised by the learned Single Judge. For that the averments made in the u,rit pctitior-r, the relief sought in the writ petition and the decisior-r of the learned Single Judge would have to be assesscd in a cumulative and conjoint manner. This is the litmus test

Calcutta High Court in Gopal Kumar Agarwat (supra) did not consider applicability of the above litmus test. Therefore, we are unable to persuade ourselves to adopt the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in copat Kumar Agarwal (supra) n'hich according to us runs contrany to the ratio laid dorvn b1. the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji (supra).

10.1

Having surveyed the 1egal provisions, the decisions now examine the facts of the present case. cited at the lrar and based on the above analysis, let us
Writ pr:tition No.40733 of 2022 was Iiled by respondent Nos.l, 2 and 3 seeking a writ of mandamus declaring the action of the State police 1lr undertaking investigation in Ir.l.R.No.455 of 2022 registered before Moinabad Police Station as biased ald unfair; violating their fundan]('ntal rights under Articles 14 arrd 21 of the Constitution of India. They, therefore, sought for a direction to transier thc investigation to the CBI or to supervision ol a sitting Judge to ensure free and fair inve stigation constitute a Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the
In the rvrit affidavit filed in support of the above prayer, it r,vas alleged that the complaint lodged by the de facto complainant against respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were false and politicall.y motivated. Investigation by the State police u,ould not be done in a fair manner. Right of the accused (respon<ient Nos. l, 2 and 3) to a fair and unbiased

investigation has been compromised. State Government is directly involved in F.l.R.No.455 of 2022.

47. Learned Single Judge after a thorough analysis held that the FiR disclosed commission of a cognizable offence; therefore, investigation is bound to be done in accordance '*,ith law. Hou.ever, materials gathered during the investigation in the form ol CDs/pen drives were circulated by the Hon'ble Chief Minister to different constitutional functionaries. Crucial documents relating to investigation have been put out in the public domain.. According to the learned Single Judge, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State could not explain regarding leakage of investigation materials. Thereafter, learned Single Judge noted that the electronic spy gadgets were seized on 26127.1O.2022 containing the video recordings which are in the nature of trap proceedings. These materials are crucial and critical components of investigation. Such materials should not have been handed over to any third party. This was a serious lapse committed by the investigation. To cover up such lapse, SIT was constituted.

Thereafter, lerrrned Single Judge came to the conclusion that before irtestigation could proceed to art advanced stage, persons holding high office such as Hon'ble Chief Minister of Telangana had condemned the accused publicly b1, branding them as conspirators and guiity. In the circumstances, learned Single Judge opined that investigation uras not being done in an unbiased and fair manner. When an authority as high as the Honble Chiel Minister harl openly circulated videos containing investigation material, branding the accused as conspirators and members of an organised gang, a case for transfer of investigation was made out. It u,as thercafter thzrt learned Single Judge passed the following order:

44-1. For the aforesaid reasons, W.P. Nos.40733, 43144 and 43339 of 2O22 are allowed. G.O.Ms. No.63 Home (Legal) Department dated 09.11..2022 appointing SIT is quashed. The investigation in FIR.No.455 of 2022 shall be forthwith transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation, who shall proceed rvith de nouo investigation taking into consideration the rep()rt lodged by Mr. Pilot Rohit Rerldy in FIR.No.4l5 of 2022, observation panchanama clated 26.1O.2022 and mediator's panchanama dated 27.10.2022. The remaining investigation done bv Assistarl Commissioner of police, Rajendralragar

t07

Division; the Station House Officer, Moinabad Police Station, and the SIT are also quashed.

Thus, learned Single Judge set aside G.O.Ms.No.63 dated 09. 11.2022 appointing SIT while directing transfer of investigation in F.l.R.No.455 of 2022 to CBI; further quashed investigation carried out by the State police ti1l then, directing that CBI shall now proceed with de nouo investigation in F.I.R.No.455 of 2022.

Conclusion:

From a careful ald conjoint analysis of the averments in the writ affidavit, relief sought for in the writ petitior.r and the order passed by the learned Single Judge, we have no hesitation in our mind that the order passed by the learned Single Judge was in the context of a criminal subject matter and certainly in the exercise of "criminal jurisdiction" in the broader sense as explained by the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Fauji (supra).
Learned Single Judge has held that rights of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 being accused in Crime No.455 of 2022 were being compromised by leakage of investigatiori'-

I08

materials and open branding of them as culprits even before charge sheet is filed. Further, learned Single Judge has quashed the investigation carried out by the police in FIR No.455 of 2022 while directing CBI to conduct de novo investigation. This is nothing but a decision rendered in the realm of criminal field; thus exercising criminal jurisdiction within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Applying the litmus test, it is evident from a combined examination of the substance of the case and the nature and character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge that the judgment under appeal is clearly within criminal law domain.

$\overline{a}$

In our considered opinion, there can be no two views in this regard. Therefore, the intra-court appeals challenging the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.12.2022 would be clearly barred by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and would not be maintainable.

Since we have arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, it is not necessary for us to delve into the merit of the

challenge or to the other aspects as argued by learned counsel for the parties.

Following the above, all the u,rit appeals are hereby dismissed as being not maintainable. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

Misceilaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.

After pronouncement of the judgment, Mr. B.S.Prasad, learned Advocate Gencral for the State of Telangana prayed for staying the judgment for some time to enable the appeliants to avarl further remedy.

Having considered the matter in detail and having pronounced the judgment, \'e are not inclined to stay the salne.

Accordingly, prayer made is rejected.

Sd/- B. SATYAVATHI DEPUTY REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER

One Fair Copy to THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN (For His Lordships' Kind Perusal)

//TRUE COPY//

One Fair Copy to THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI (For His Lordships' Kind Perusal)

To.

1. 11 L.R. Copies.
1. The Under Secretary, Union of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi.
1. The Secretary, Telangana Advocates Association Library, High Court Buildings, Hyderabad
1. Two CCs to the Advocate General, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad [OUT]
1. One CC to Ms. BANDARU HIMA VARSHINI, Advocate [OPUC]
1. One CC to SRI M.V.V. BASWA RAJ, Advocate [OPUC]
1. One CC to SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO, Advocate [OPUC]
1. One CC to SRI N. NAGENDRAN, S.C. FOR CBI [OPUC]
1. One CC to SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, Deputy Solicitor General of India $[OPUC]$
1. One CC to SRI V. RAM MOHAN REDDY, Advocate [OPUC]
1. One CC to SRI BALASUBRAHMANYAM KUMARSU, Advocate [OPUC]
1. Two CD Copies.

$\mathsf{MP}$

HCJ $&$ NTR,J

DATED:06/02/2023

COMMON JUDGMENT

WA NOs.36, 37, 41, 42, 43 AND 44 OF 2023

DISMISSING THE WRIT APPEALS WITHOUT COSTS

The State Of Telangana And 4 Others vs. Bhusarapu Srinivas And 9 Others

AI Summary

Order Issued After Hearing

Original Order Copy

Order Text

HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI

WRIT APPEAL Nos.36, 37, 41, 42, 43 and 44 OF 2023

WRIT APPEAL NO: 36 OF 2023

Between:

...APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

AND

....RESPONDENT/PETITIONER

lA NO: 1 OF 2023

Counsel for the Appellants: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel for the Respondent No.3: SRI GANDRA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

WRIT APPEAL NO: 37 OF 2023

...APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

AND

....RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

IA NO: 1 OF 2023

Counsel for the Appellants: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel for the Respondent No.4: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

Counsel for the Respondent No.5: SRI N. NAGENDRAN, S.C. FOR CBI

Counsel for the Respondent No.6: SRI GANDRA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

WRIT APPEAL NO: 41 OF 2023

Between:

...APPELLANT/RESPONDENT NO.8

AND

....RESPONDENT/PETITIONER

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

lA NO: 1 OF 2023

Counsel for the Appellant:

SRI GANDRA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

Counsel for the Respondent No.1 : SRI S.D. SANJAY TlWARl, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR M/S. BANDARU HIMAVARSHINI

WRIT APPEAL NO:42 OF 2023

...APPELLANT/RESPONDENT NO.8

AND

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

lA NO: 1 OF 2023

Counsel for the Appellant: SRI GANORA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

Counsel for the Respondent No.9: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

Counsel for the Respondent No.10: SRI N. NAGENDRAN, S.C. FOR CBI

WRIT APPEAL NO: 43 OF 2023

Between:

...APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

AND

....RESPONDENT/PETITIONER

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

lA NO: 1 OF 2023

Counsel for the Appellants: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

WRIT APPEAL NO:44 OF 2023

Between

...APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

AND

...RESPONDENT/PETITIONER

...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

IA NO: 1 OF 2023

Counsel for the Appellants: SRI DUSHYANT DAVE, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI J. PRABHAKAR AND SRI C.DAMODAR REDDY, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI BALASUBRAHMANYAM KUMARSU

Counsel for the Respondent No.4: SRI GANDRA MOHAN RAO, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI A. PRABHAKAR RAO

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI

WRIT APPEAL Nos.36, 37, 41, 42, 43 and 44 OF 2023

COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Ujjal Bhuyan)

Facts:

Sub missions:

Analysis:

Conclusion:

Accordingly, prayer made is rejected.

Sd/- B. SATYAVATHI DEPUTY REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER

One Fair Copy to THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN (For His Lordships' Kind Perusal)

One Fair Copy to THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI (For His Lordships' Kind Perusal)

To.

COMMON JUDGMENT

WA NOs.36, 37, 41, 42, 43 AND 44 OF 2023

DISMISSING THE WRIT APPEALS WITHOUT COSTS

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Order(1) - 6 Feb 2023