APHC010382742003

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3369] AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction)

MONDAY. THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO

SECOND APPEALNO: 560/2003

Between:

N kamala Kumari

...APPELLANT

AND

P L Ssuryanarayanamma Anr

...RESPONDENT

Counsel for the Appellant:

1.K SUBRAHMANYAM

Counsel for the Respondent:

1.NARASIMHA RAO DAVULURI

The Court made the following JUDGMENT:

1. This Second Appeal has been filed by the Appellant/Appellant/Plaintiff against the Decree and Judgment dated 19.02.1999, in A.S.No.75 of 1991 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur (for short, 'the 1^st Appellate Court') confirming the decree and Judgment dated 15.02.1991, in O.S.No.725 of 1985 on the file of I Additional District Munsif, Kovvur (for short, 'the trial Court').

$2.$ The Appellant/Appellant is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S.No.725 of 1985 seeking specific performance of a contract of sale dated 06.03.1982 executed by the $1^{st}$ Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff.

3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit in O.S. No.725 of 1985 is expedient to mitigate any potential confusion and better comprehend the case.

4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:

The 1st Defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to Plaintiff for Rs.7,800/-. An earnest payment of Rs.400/- was received by the 1st Defendant, who then executed an agreement of sale in favour of the Plaintiff on 5.3.1984. Subsequently, Plaintiff paid Rs.1,100/-, which the 1st Defendant acknowledged on a separate stamped paper. The Plaintiff consistently demonstrated readiness and willingness to fulfill her part of the contract, including paying the remaining balance of sale consideration. However, the 1st Defendant failed to cooperate and did not execute a registered sale deed after receiving the balance of the sale consideration. Despite multiple attempts by the Plaintiff and her husband to request the execution of the sale deed including issuing a legal notice, the 1st Defendant responded with false claims. The time is not an essence contract. Plaintiff learned through this response that the 1st Defendant had sold the plaint schedule property to the 2nd Defendant under a sale deed dated 16.06.1985. This sale deed is alleged to be a sham, nominal, and collusive, created to undermine the Plaintiff's rights. The Plaintiff, having already deposited the balance of the sale consideration in Andhra Bank, Koyyalagadam (S.B.Account No.4478), is now filing suit against both Defendants, seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale or a refund of the earnest money with interest.

5. In the written statement, the 1st Defendant admitted to entering an agreement of sale with Plaintiff on 06.08.1984 and acknowledged receiving Rs.400/- as earnest money on that day. The 1st Defendant claimed the

remaining balance of sale consideration was to be paid within three months from the date of the agreement, failing which the agreement would be automatically cancelled. The Plaintiff lacked the funds to pay the balance within the stipulated period and afterwards. Consequently, since the Plaintiff failed to pay the balance of the sale consideration within three months, she became liable to pay double the advance amount. The Plaintiff was not ready and willing to fulfill her part of the contract, and that time was of the essence in the agreement. On 20.11.1984, the 1st Defendant sent a personal notice, but the Plaintiff knowingly refused to receive it. The 1st Defendant explained that she urgently needed money to perform her daughter's marriage, which led her to enter into a second agreement with the Plaintiff's husband. At that time, an additional sum of Rs.1100/- was paid, and the time for payment of the remaining balance was set for 01.09.1984. It was agreed that if the Plaintiff failed to pay by this date, the earnest money, totaling Rs. 1500/-, would be forfeited. The 1st Defendant emphasized that time was also made essential in this second agreement. Due to the Plaintiff's failure to meet the conditions of both agreements, the 1st Defendant could not perform her daughter's marriage, as she lacked the necessary funds. Despite waiting a considerable amount of time, Plaintiff was still unwilling or unable to fulfill her contractual obligations. After the expiration of the second agreement, the 1st Defendant sent another personal notice on 20.11.1984, but the Plaintiff again failed to comply. As a result, the 1st Defendant, needing the money urgently, sold the plaint schedule property to the 2nd Defendant to finance her daughter's wedding. Under these circumstances, the earnest money was forfeited, the sale agreement was cancelled, and the Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to any relief.

6. The 2nd Defendant filed a separate written statement, asserting that he was unaware of any sale agreement in favour of Plaintiff and denying Plaintiff's claim of part payment. He explained that he owns property adjacent to the plaint schedule property, and upon learning that the 1st Defendant intended to sell the property, he approached her and purchased it for

Rs.10,000/-. A registered sale deed was executed by the 1st Defendant on 16.06.1985. The 2nd Defendant also stated that he spent Rs.4,000/- to fill a pit and improve the plaint schedule property. He asserts that the present suit was filed solely to cause him trouble and believes that the alleged second agreement of sale and the Plaintiff's claimed payments are fabrications. Therefore, he contends that the suit should be dismissed.

7. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues:

i. Whether the agreement dt.6.3.1984 is true and valid? If so, whether it defeat the bonafide sale in favour of 2nd Defendant?

ii. To what relief?

8. During the trial, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.5 on behalf of the Plaintiff. Conversely, on behalf of the Defendants, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.3.

9. After the conclusion of the trial and considering the arguments presented by both parties, the trial Court dismissed the suit in O.S.No.725 of 1985. However, the trial Court decided that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover Rs.1,500/- from the 1st Defendant, with interest at 6% per annum from the date of payments until its realization.

10. Aggrieved by the same, the Plaintiff filed an Appeal in A.S. No.75 of 1991 on file of the 1st Appellate Court. The 1st Appellate Court, after scrutinizing oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides, dismissed the Appeal with costs by its Judgment and Decree dated 19.02.1999. Assailing the same, the Plaintiff preferred the present Second Appeal.

11. I heard Sri K. Subrahmanyam, learned Counsel representing the Appellant/Plaintiff, but none represented the Respondents/Defendants.

12. Although notice was sent to the Respondents, it could not be served due to the absence of a door number. It appears that the notice was sent to the same address provided during the trial court proceedings; however, it was returned un-served. Despite being granted several adjournments, no representation has been made on behalf of the Respondents. Therefore, the matter is deemed to have been heard on behalf of the Respondents.

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13. Based on the Appellant's contentions, the following substantial question of law is involved in this Second Appeal:

Whether the finding of readiness and willingness to perform the contract of sale of immovable property, ignoring material evidence of the deposit of the balance amount of Rs.6,325/- and without considering her capacity valid and correct?

14. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C.

15. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs. and others¹ , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:

Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 713) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438)……

16. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C., arise only when there is a substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in Second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in nature in terms of law.

1 2006 (3) ALT 41 (SC)

17. In the Second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial questions of law involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary evidence. Further, the substantial questions of law are the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record.

18. In a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale, a heavy burden lies upon Plaintiff to prove not only the execution of the sale agreement but also his entitlement to the relief thereunder. Mere proof of the agreement does not, by itself, entail a grant of relief. The Court is not bound to grant specific relief merely because it is lawful. The discretion conferred upon the courts is not arbitrary but must be exercised reasonably and soundly, guided by judicial principles. While exercising discretion, the Court is required to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case meticulously.

19. There is no dispute concerning the proposition that a suit for a specific performance burden is always on the Plaintiff to prove and aver that he is always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract throughout. Mere taking a plea in the plaint is not sufficient; the Plaintiff should prove, with cogent evidence, his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract at all material times, i.e. from the date of the contract till the date of the suit. It is also settled law that the grant of decree for specific performance is a discretionary relief. Undoubtedly, discretion has to be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily.

20. As previously mentioned, the trial Court declined to grant the relief of specific performance pertaining to the agreement of sale dated 06.03.1984. However, it awarded an alternative relief of refund of the advance amount with

6

interest to the Plaintiff. The 1st Appellate Court subsequently upheld the trial Court's findings, resulting in the dismissal of the Appeal Suit.

21. Before considering the rival contentions raised on behalf of both sides, it is relevant to refer to the admitted facts born out from the record.

22. The 1st Defendant was the owner of the plaint schedule property. The Plaintiff agreed to purchase the plaint schedule property for a total consideration of Rs.7,800/-, formalized in Ex.A.1 on 06.03.1984. According to the terms outlined in Ex.A.1, the Plaintiff was obligated to pay the balance of sale consideration by 30.06.1984. Furthermore, it stipulated that should the 1st Defendant fail to execute the sale deed, she would be liable to pay the Plaintiff double the amount of earnest money. Conversely, if the Plaintiff could not pay the sale consideration balance within the specified timeframe, the agreement would be deemed cancelled, and the earnest money paid would be forfeited. It is acknowledged that Plaintiff later made a payment of Rs.1100/- to the 1st Defendant on 17.09.1984. Subsequently, the Plaintiff executed Ex.A.2 agreement, which extended the time for the Plaintiff to pay the balance of sale consideration until 18.10.1984.

23. The record indicates that the 1st Defendant did not contest the Appeal Suit; however, the 2nd Defendant, who acquired the schedule property through Ex.B.2 sale deed dated 16.04.1985, did contest the Appeal Suit. Furthermore, the Plaintiff sent Ex.A.3, a registered notice, to the 1st Defendant through his advocate. In response, the 1st Defendant issued Ex.A.4, a reply notice dated 04.06.1985, to the Plaintiff's advocate. The correspondence between the parties reveals that both parties maintained remarkably similar stand throughout the litigation.

24. It is canvassed on behalf of the Plaintiff before the trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court that time should not be regarded as the essence of the contract, particularly in light of the execution of Ex.A.2 agreement. As discerned from the trial Court's judgment, it concluded that Ex.A.2, the second agreement of sale, exhibited material alterations. The Defendants contend

that the portion struck off in Ex.A.2 constitutes a material alteration. However, the 1st Appellate Court noted that neither the 1st Defendant nor the 2nd Defendant asserted in their written statements that Ex.A.2 had been materially altered. Consequently, it was deemed untenable for the 2nd Defendant to claim that Ex.A.2 is materially altered. Furthermore, the 1st Defendant, as a party to Ex.A.2, did not raise such contention; thus, the 2nd Defendant, who is not a party to Ex.A.2, lacks the standing to argue that there has been a material alteration. By articulating cogent reasons, the 1st Appellate Court upheld Plaintiff's contention that Ex.A.2 was not materially altered.

25. Regarding the Plaintiff's assertion that the 1st Defendant failed to issue a notice under Section 64 of the Indian Contract Act before rescinding the contract, both courts noted that the 1st Defendant had indeed sent a letter to the Plaintiff, as evidenced by Ex.B.1, dated 28.11.1985. However, it was not delivered to the Plaintiff due to an endorsement indicating that the Plaintiff was absent from the residence. Upon reviewing the evidence, the 1st Appellate Court concluded that the Plaintiff intentionally evaded receipt of the notice, thereby establishing valid compliance with Section 64 of the Indian Contract Act.

26. Admittedly, the schedule property is agricultural land. Furthermore, the Appellant's Counsel argues that the Hon'ble Apex Court has consistently held in various judgments that time should not be considered the essence of a contract in transactions involving immovable property. Nevertheless, both the trial Court as well as 1st Appellate Court, after consideration of the oral and documentary evidence presented, determined that time is indeed of the essence in the contract.

27. In Chunduru Padmavati V. Chunduru Narasimha Rao ² , the Combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, held as under:

"7. It is well settled that in the case of contracts relating to the sale of immovable property, generally, time is not regarded as the essence of

2 2000(1) ALT 613

the contract. It is, however, open to the parties to make time the essence of the contract by making express provisions on that behalf in the contract. It can also be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Even though time was not made initially the essence of the contract, it can be made by subsequent notice. In Chandi Rani v. Kamal Rani, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that even where time is not of the essence of the contract. the Plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract, nature of the property and the object of making the contract. This principle was reiterated in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, 1997 (2) Supreme 597, where the Apex Court, in keeping with the changing times, has made a bold departure from the traditional rule that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of immovable properties in the following words:

"Indeed we are inclined to think that the rigour of the rule evolved" by Courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of immoveable properties evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown-requires to be relaxed if not modified, particularly in the case of urban immoveable properties. It is high time we do so."

In Smt. Chand Rani (dead) by L.R.S. V. Smt. Kamal Rani (dead)³, 28. the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:

It is a well-settled principle of law that in the case of the sale of immovable property, time is not the essence of the contract. However, if the parties agree to a specified time to perform their part of the contract, then time is the essence of the contract, and the parties shall adhere to the same.

In Nalamathu Venkaiva (deceased by L.R.) & Another V. $29.$ B.S.Neelakanta⁴, this Court observed as follows:

26. ............though there is no express term in the agreement, the conditions stipulated for payment would go to show that time is the essence of the contract, and the plaintiffs failed to comply with the

^{(1993) 1} SCC 519

²⁰⁰⁵ SCC Online AP 578

condition by paying or depositing the first instalment within the stipulated time.

30. In Saradamani Kandappan V. S.Rajalakshmi and others ⁵ , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows:

28. The intention to make time stipulated for payment of balance consideration will be considered to be the essence of the contract where such intention is evident from the express terms or the circumstances necessitating the sale set out in the agreement. If, for example, the vendor discloses in the agreement of sale, the reason for the sale and the reason for stipulating that time prescribed for payment be the essence of the contract, that is, say, the need to repay a particular loan before a particular date, or to meet an urgent time-bound need (say medical or educational expenses of a family member) time stipulated for payment will be considered to be the essence. Even if the urgent need for the money within the specified time is not set out, if the words used clearly show an intention of the parties to make time the essence of the contract, with reference to payment, time will be held to be the essence of the contract.

………………………

37…….A purchaser can no longer take shelter under the principle that time is not of the essence in the performance of contracts relating to immovable property to cover his delays, laches, breaches and "non-readiness". …….In these days of galloping increases in prices of immovable properties, to hold that a vendor who took earnest money of, say, about 10% of the sale price and agreed for three months or four months as the period for performance did not intend that time should be the essence, will be a cruel joke on him, and will result in injustice…..

The precedents from an era when high inflation was unknown, holding that time is not of the essence of the contract in regard to immovable properties, may no longer apply, not because the principle laid down therein is unsound or erroneous, but the circumstances that existed when the said principle was evolved, no longer exist. Adding to the misery is the delay in the disposal of cases relating to specific performance, as suits and appeals therefrom routinely take two to three decades to attain finality. As a result, an owner agreeing to sell a property for rupees one lakh and receiving rupees ten thousand as advance may be required to

5 (2011) 12 SCC 18

execute a sale deed a quarter century later by receiving the remaining rupees ninety thousand when the property value has risen to a crore of rupees.

31. The trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court have considered the oral and documentary evidence to conclude that time is the essence of the contract. Both the Courts, concerning Ex.A.1 and A.2, observed that a time limit is specified in the Ex.A.1 agreement. Both parties agreed that if Plaintiff failed to pay the balance of the sale consideration amount by 30.06.1984, the earnest money would be forfeited, and the agreement would be treated as cancelled. Suppose the 1st Defendant fails to perform her part of the contract by receiving the balance sale consideration and executing the registered sale deed. In that case, the 1st Defendant shall pay to double the earnest money. Thus, both parties intended to pay the sale price by the stipulated date.

32. The record shows that the 1st Defendant accepted a partial payment of Rs.1100/- on 17.09.1984, and subsequently executed a fresh sale agreement. As both the Courts correctly noted, Ex.A.2 stipulated a new deadline for the payment of the sale consideration by 18.10.1984. Upon thorough examination of Exs.A.1 and A.2, both the Courts reached a concurrent conclusion that the conditions outlined in Ex.A.1 remain binding on both parties; however, the timeframe for payment was extended by Ex.A.2. Based on the recitals in Ex.A.1 and A.2, along with the oral evidence presented, both courts determined that this extension indicates the parties' intention for the contract to be performed within the extended timeframe, rather than merely serving as a stipulation for the payment of the remaining sale consideration. Plaintiff should have remitted the balance within the original timeline stipulated in Ex.A.1, leading to the extension until 18.10.1984, to pay the remaining consideration. The evidence presented indicates that the Plaintiff did not possess the funds necessary to meet the balance consideration within the periods specified in Exs.A.1 and A.2. Furthermore, the Plaintiff issued Ex.A.3, a legal notice dated 06.03.1985, demanding that the 1st Defendant execute a sale deed. Upon consideration of Ex.A.3, both Courts observed a lack of

evidence to demonstrate that Plaintiff was ready and willing to fulfill her contractual obligations by 18.10.1984. Moreover, no evidence indicates that the Plaintiff made any efforts to pay the remaining amount before sending Ex.A.3 on 06.03.1985. Consequently, no material was presented to show that the Plaintiff had the necessary funds for the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time under Ex.A.2.

33. The intention to make time stipulated for payment of balance consideration will be considered the essence of the contract where such intention is evident from the express terms or the circumstances necessitating the sale set out in the agreement. Even if the urgent need for the money within the specified time is not set out if the words used clearly show an intention of the parties to make time the essence of the contract regarding payment, time will be held to be the essence of the contract.

$34.$ The Plaintiff has to prove that he has the money or has alternatively made necessary arrangements to get the money. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Plaintiff is a precedent for granting the relief of specific performance; this circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the Court while granting an order refusing to grant the relief. In U.N. Krishnamurthy (since deceased) Thr. L.Rs. V. A.M.Krishnamurthy⁶, the Apex Court also held that:

There is a distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the contract, and both ingredients are necessary for the relief of Specific Performance. In His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar⁷ Cited by Mr Venugopal, this Court said that there was a difference between readiness and willingness to perform a contract. While readiness means the capacity of the Plaintiff to perform the contract, which would include his financial position, willingness relates to the conduct of the Plaintiff. The same view was taken by this Court in Kalawati v. Rakesh Kumar⁸.

⁽²⁰²²⁾ SCC Online 840

$(1996)$ 4 SCC 526

$(2018)$ 3 SCC 658

In N.P.Thirugnanam Vs. Dr R.Jagan Mohan Rao⁹, the Apex Court $35.$ held that:

It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and is at the discretion of the Court, which discretion requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short "the Act"). Under Section 20, the Court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was a valid agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that the Plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the Defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of Plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the Court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the Plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the Plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the Court must take into consideration the conduct of the Plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit, along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the Defendant must, of necessity, be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till the date of the decree, he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated. the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The Court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the Plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

36. In Sukhwinder Singh Vs. Jagroop Singh¹⁰, the Apex Court held that:

The suit being the one for specific performance of the contract on payment of the balance sale consideration, the readiness and willingness were required to be proved by the Plaintiff and was to be considered by the Courts below as a basic requirement if a decree for specific performance is to be granted.

^{(1995) 5} SCC 115

37. Both Courts have concurrently held that the agreement stipulates a timeframe for paying the balance amount alongside a default clause for nonpayment. The evidence indicates that the Plaintiff was unable to remit the balance sale consideration within the timeframe outlined in Ex.A.1, as well as within the extended period granted by Ex.A.2. Upon careful consideration of the evidence, both Courts determined that the parties intended for time to be of the essence in the contract. Additionally, both Courts noted that Plaintiff delayed six months before issuing a legal notice to the 1st Defendant demanding the execution of the sale deed. The Plaintiff also failed to provide evidence demonstrating readiness and willingness to fulfill her contractual obligations. Although the Plaintiff presented Ex.A.5, an Andhra Bank passbook bearing Account No.4478, which was opened in September 1985, the 1st Appellate Court aptly observed that it did not substantiate the Plaintiff's claim of being ready and willing to perform her part of the contract by 18.10.1984.

38. At the cost of repetition, whether time is an essence of the contract depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case, after considering the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and other material placed before the Court, this Court views that, as per the terms of the agreement, time is the essence of the contract. In light of the well-established principles of law referenced above, this Court is of the opinion that both the trial court and the 1st Appellate Court appropriately analysed the evidence on record. They concluded that the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she was consistently ready and willing to perform her obligations under the contract.

39. The findings of the trial court, which the 1st Appellate Court has affirmed, are neither perverse nor the result of misinterpretation of documents or misreading of evidence. Upon carefully reviewing the materials on record, this Court concludes that both the trial court and the 1st Appellate Court concurrently dismissed the Plaintiff's suit for specific performance, thoroughly recording all relevant factual findings. These findings do not contradict the

pleadings, evidence, or law provisions. Consequently, this Court holds that the conclusions drawn by the trial and 1st Appellate courts are not subject to interference under Section 100 of the C.P.C. No question of law, let alone a substantial question of law, is pertinent to this Second Appeal; therefore, the Appeal must be dismissed.

40. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. The judgment and decree dated 19.02.1999 of learned Senior Civil Judge, Kovvur in A.S.No.75 of 1991 stands confirmed.

Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, in this Second Appeal, shall stand closed.

_____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO

Date: 14.10.2024 SAK

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO

SECOND APPEAL NO. 560 OF 2003

Date:14.10.2024

SAK