Dachuri Atchi Reddy vs. The Senior Civil Judge

Final Order
Court:High Court of Andhra Pradesh
Judge:Hon'ble Prashant Kumar Mishra
Case Status:Dismissed
Order Date:1 Sept 2022
CNR:APHC010311872022

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Order Issued After Hearing

Purpose:

Disposed

Before:

Hon'ble Prashant Kumar Mishra , D.V.S.S.Somayajulu

Listed On:

13 Jul 2022

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Order Text

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, CHIEFJUSTICE

&

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.V.S.S. SOMAYAJULU

REVIEW PETITION I.A.No.1 of 2022

in

WRIT PETITION No.19367 of 2022

(Through physical mode)

Dachuri Atchi Reddy S/o Pera Reddy, Hindu, aged about 72 years, Retired Employee, R/o Flat No.302, 27-62-10, Aditya Apartment, Ramjit Nagar, Balaji Nagar, Stone House Peta, SPSR Nellore District. He is represented by his Spl. Power of Attorney Holder i.e., Petitioner No.3 and four others

.. Petitioners

Versus

The Senior Civil Judge, Kandukur, Prakasam District and another

.. Respondents

Counsel for the petitioners : Madala Narasinga Rao

Counsel for the respondents: --

ORAL ORDER

Dt:01.09.2022

(per D.V.S.S.Somayajulu, J)

This Review Petition is filed by the writ petitioner questioning the order dated 13.07.2022, in W.P.No.19367 of 2022, passed by this Court on the ground that this Court did not follow the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which is cited by the counsel for the petitioner and had in fact relied upon a judgment which is not applicable to the facts of the case. It is also submitted that the explanation to the section permits "something more" than what is stated in the main provision and that the explanation which is meant to clarify and has expanded the scope of the main provision.

  1. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the review petitioner at length. However, this court finds that it is not able to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner for the following among other reasons:

  2. The explanation to the section, which the learned counsel relied upon, deals with the payment of Court fee for a Succession Certificate after the initial certificate has been granted. The Explanation clearly states where a certificate is to be extended under Section 373 of the Indian Succession Act, fee shall be computed at 1 ½ times, the rate mentioned, subject to the Court fee already paid at the

2

original Succession Certificate is applied for. The review petitioner relied on the Bihta Co-operative Development Cane Marketing Union Ltd., and Ors., v The Bank of Bihar and Ors.,<sup>1</sup> to argue that an explanation cannot widen the ambit of the section. However, this Court finds that this judgment is not the last word on the subject. In Government of Andhra Pradesh v Corporation Bank<sup>2</sup> it was held as follows in paras 10 and 12:

"10. The nature of an Explanation has been the matter of a statutory interpretation in a number of judgments of this Court.

12. In construing a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction. If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the other rules of construction. The other rules of construction are invoked when the legislative intent is not clear. In Bihta Co-op. Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar<sup>3</sup> this Court was called upon to consider Explanation to Section 48(1) of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935. This Court observed that the Court should not go only by the label. The Court observed that an explanation must be read ordinarily to clear up any ambiguity in the main section and it cannot be construed to widen the ambit of the section. However**, if on a true reading of an Explanation it appears to the Court in a given case that the effect of the Explanation is to widen the scope of the main section then effect must be given to the legislative intent.** It was held that in all such cases the Court has to find out the true intention of the legislature. Therefore, there is no single yardstick to decide whether an Explanation is enacted

<sup>1</sup> (1967) 1 SCR 848

<sup>2</sup> (2007) 9 SCC 55

<sup>3</sup> AIR 1967 SC 389

to clarify the ambiguity or whether it is enacted to widen the scope of the main section. ..." (Emphasis supplied)

  1. Further in Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v State of

Maharashtra<sup>4</sup> the following was held in para-9:

"9. ...It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot control or deflect such intention. It must be remembered that the legislature has different ways of expressing itself and in the last analysis the words used by the legislature alone are the true repository of the intent of the legislature and they must be construed having regard to the context and setting in which they occur. Therefore, even though the provision in question has been called an Explanation, we must construe it according to its plain language and not on any a priori considerations." (Emphasis supplied)

  1. Therefore, by giving a plain language interpretation to what is styled as an "explanation" this Court holds that it does not enlarge or widen the ambit of the original section.

  2. This Court is also of the opinion that there is no arbitrary exercise of power for the vires to be challenged. In fact, this Court noticed in the original order itself that the revision petitioner does not question the proviso as violative of a constitutional provision or that it is beyond the legislative's competence. Pleading and proof adduced by

<sup>4</sup> (1977) 2 SCC 548

the revision petitioner is absolutely inadequate for relief prayed on the vires.

  1. This Court notices that this section has been on the statute since 1956, when the Andhra Pradesh Suits Valuation Act was enacted. A similar provision is also found in the Court Fee Act, 1870.

  2. Lastly, this Court notices that in matters of fiscal statutes Courts will give greater latitude to the legislature and the power to strike down the legislation should also be carefully exercised in such cases. This is stated in the judgment reported in Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v P. Laxmi Devi5.

  3. In the opinion of this Court the explanation in the Court Fee Act, which is the subject matter of the writ petition, deals with two different scenarios (a) when an application is made for the initial issuance of Succession Certificate, the Court fee at the specific rate is fixed (b) as per the explanation if the petitioner seeks the extension of the Succession Certificate for certain items which he has missed out etc., a separate slab of Court Fee is mentioned. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the explanation in this case does not widen the ambit of main Section. On the other hand, it deals with a different fact situation or scenario. In order to discourage filing of multiple petitions for issuance of Succession Certificate a different slab rate is prescribed

<sup>5</sup> 2008 (4) SCC 720

at 1 ½ times of Court Fee already paid. There is a clear and discernable reason for this.

  1. Lastly, the law on the subject for review is sufficiently well settled. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati<sup>6</sup> , following was held in paragraph 19.

"19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction."

The summary of principles mentioned in paragraph 20, 20.1

and 20.2 are reproduced hereunder:

*"*20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words "any other sufficient reason" have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR

<sup>6</sup> (2013) 8 SCC 320

1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT (2013) 8 SC 275]

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived."

  1. In the opinion of this Court, these findings mentioned supra are squarely applicable to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There is no material manifest on the face of the order to order a review and even if the submission of the learned counsel is to be accepted as true it would mean a "possible view" and not the only view possible. The mere fact that there are two possible views is not a ground for review, as per settled law.

  2. In view of all of the above, this Court finds that there are no grounds to review the judgment. The same is therefore dismissed. No costs.

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, CJ D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU, J

Ssv

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